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Brand Fetishism
KATYA ASSAF
This Article focuses on “brand fetishism”—the phenomenon of
perceiving trademarks as spiritual entities rather than as informational
devices. Modern corporations strive to create brands with personalities
and souls, brands that tug at consumers’ heartstrings. Meanwhile,
trademark law is intended to protect trademarks as informational tools
reducing consumers’ search costs. This Article examines this dissonance
between trademark law rationales and the current use of the corporate
trademark.
Research demonstrates that emotional branding results in mistaken
quality judgments and hinders rational purchasing decisions by
consumers, thereby distorting market competition. Therefore, this Article
proposes that trademark law should serve to discourage brand fetishism,
and should act to restore the original informative function of trademarks.
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, trademark law in practice supports and
encourages brand fetishism. This Article surveys the various doctrines in
trademark law that, deliberately or not, result in this undesirable outcome,
and suggests subsequent changes.
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Brand Fetishism
KATYA ASSAF*
I. INTRODUCTION
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.”1
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet famously criticizes the human
tendency to focus on a name or appearance, and to disregard substance.
After discovering that Romeo is of Montague stock, and hence her sworn
enemy, Juliet realizes that a name is a meaningless convention. What
matters is who someone actually is, and not what he is called. Through his
tragic story of star-crossed lovers, Shakespeare implies that humankind’s
natural tendency toward superficiality should be resisted, because it causes
irrational and harmful behavior. To quote another common aphorism, one
should not judge a book by its cover.
In the world of trademarks too, there is sometimes a conflation
between label and substance. The primary purpose of trademark law has
traditionally been to protect trademarks as labels, as tools enabling the
consumer to identify products of various manufacturers. That is, in the
legal sense, a trademark is a name, a designation, and not the rose itself.
Just as the word “rose” indicates a flower with certain characteristics, so
too should a trademark indicate a product with a certain level of quality. In
practice, however, trademark owners often strive to elevate form over
substance—the trademark over the physical products it signifies. At times
they succeed.
For instance, consumers rate the taste of soda higher when it carries the
name “Coca-Cola” than when it does not.2 Clothing tags have migrated
from their hidden location inside the collar to the outside, grown
exponentially in size, and transformed items of clothing into mere carriers

* Assistant Professor, Law School, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank
Michael Birnhack, David Enoch, Wendy Gordon, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Barak Medina, Neil W.
Netanel, Michal Shur-Ofry, Alexei Soma, Rebecca Tushnet, Steven Wilf, Helena Zakowska-Henzler,
and Eyal Zamir for their invaluable comments, insights, and suggestions.
1
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
2
See, e.g., Sanjoy Ghose & Oded Lowengart, Taste Test: Impact of Consumer Perceptions and
Preferences on Brand Positioning Strategies, 10 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR
MARKETING 26, 30 (2001) (“In a blind taste test, Diet Pepsi was preferred by 51 per cent of the
subjects while Diet Coke was preferred by 44 per cent. . . . [A] branded taste test resulted in Diet Pepsi
being preferred by 23 per cent with Diet Coke being preferred by 65 per cent.”).
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of the brand they represent. And the Harley-Davidson brand has been
described as being so powerful as to be “in effect, a religious icon around
which an entire ideology of consumption is articulated.”4
As early as 1942, Justice Frankfurter observed: “The protection of
trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the psychological function of
symbols.”5 Indeed, trademark law shines its spotlight on symbols, which
at times carry with them strong psychological messages. Much of
marketing research focuses on various strategies for building strong
brands—brands that represent coherent sets of values and ideals, brands
that evoke a consumer’s feelings, and most importantly, brands that
guarantee a consumer’s loyalty.6 Much of academic consumer research is
dedicated to revealing how consumers perceive brands.7
Although marketing and consumer research dealt directly with the
subject of trademark protection, the legal literature has, for many years,
largely ignored its insights. Until recently, interdisciplinary research in
trademark law has focused primarily on law and economics. Only in the
past few years have trademark scholars begun to venture into other
disciplines.8
Important as it may be, economic analysis provides little insight into
the ways many successful trademarks function today. Traditional
economic analysis views trademarks as devices that provide product
information and reduce consumer search costs.9 Yet, many consumers
who are loyal to a certain brand of soft drinks or cigarettes, ostensibly
because of the superior taste of the product, actually cannot distinguish
their favorite brand in a blind taste-test.10 Moreover, consumer research
3

NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 28 (2002).
John W. Schouten & James H. McAlexander, Subcultures of Consumption: An Ethnography of
the New Bikers, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 43, 50 (1995).
5
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
6
See infra Part II.B (discussing the emergence of brand fetishism).
7
See infra notes 44–66 and accompanying text (discussing various conclusions about brand
conception from academic research).
8
See, e.g., Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1, 2–3
(2008) (suggesting a semiotic model to examine several doctrines of trademark law); Barton Beebe,
The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24 (2004) (applying tools of
semiotics to trademark law); Thomas R. Lee et al., Sophistication, Bridging the Gap, and the
Likelihood of Confusion: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 913, 914–15
(2008) (using theoretical models from consumer psychology and an empirical study to examine the
factors influencing consumer confusion); Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution:
Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265, 265 (2000)
(detailing an empirical study examining the psychological effects of trademark dilution and suggesting
the adoption of cognitive science as a normative basis justifying anti-dilution protection); Jerre B.
Swann, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 945 (2006) (using
consumer research to explain the extensive legal protection of strong marks). A notable step forward in
this context is LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE
(2008) (suggesting various interdisciplinary perspectives on U.K. trademark law).
9
See infra Part II.A (discussing the traditional view of trademarks).
10
Ghose & Lowengart, supra note 2, at 30.
4
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shows that brands are frequently imputed to have character traits. Brands
can even serve as viable relationship partners, and can evoke feelings of
love and passion.11 Some brands, such as Apple and Harley-Davidson,
have been found to serve as objects of cult and ritual.12 The existence of
these phenomena, referred to collectively as “brand fetishism,” is
inconsistent with the basic premises of traditional economic analysis of
trademark law, which takes a purely functional view of the trademark.
The tension between the trend toward brand fetishism and the
economic analysis of trademark law has garnered scant attention from legal
scholars. This Article seeks to remedy this gap in the literature. It first
surveys data culled from the fields of marketing research and consumer
research to provide insights into the phenomenon of brand fetishism. The
Article then argues that brand fetishism distorts the primary economic
function of trademarks and hinders efficient market competition.
Therefore, this Article suggests that trademark law should act to
discourage this practice.
In fact, brand fetishism enjoys extensive legal endorsement and
encouragement. As an illustration, let us consider brand extensions into
far-flung product fields, a topic which this Article will revisit.
Brand extensions are an extremely profitable commercial practice.13
Marketing research has found that a brand is more extendible the more
general its concept—that is, the less the concept is tied to a physical
product.14 Brands closely associated with a product category, such as
Campbell’s Soup, Chiquita, or Kleenex cannot be extended very far.15 By
contrast, brands with a high imaginary content are hardly restrained by
product areas.16 Thus, Harley-Davidson sells sunglasses, hair accessories,
and underwear alongside its motorcycles; and Jaguar markets not only
sports cars, but also perfume, lipstick, and body lotion.17
In other words, ironically, trademarks with highly informative,
11

See infra notes 47–51, 62 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 64–67.
13
Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of Trademark
Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2006).
14
DAVID A. AAKER & ERICH JOACHIMSTHALER, BRAND LEADERSHIP 154–55 (2000); JESPER
KUNDE, CORPORATE RELIGION 81 (2000); C. Whan Park et al., Evaluation of Brand Extensions: The
Role of Product Feature Similarity and Brand Concept Consistency, 18 J. CONSUMER RES. 185, 192
(1991).
15
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55.
16
Id.; Susan M. Broniarczyk & Joseph W. Alba, The Importance of the Brand in Brand
Extension, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 214, 226–27 (1994); Mark S. Glynn & Roderick J. Brodie, The
Importance of Brand-Specific Associations in Brand Extension: Further Empirical Results, 7 J.
PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 509, 509 (1998); Park et al., supra note 14, at 192.
17
See, e.g., JAG COLLECTION, http://www.jagcollection.co.uk/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2010)
(selling items such as clothing, fragrances, and teddy bears); Motorclothes Merchandise, HARLEYDAVIDSON, http://www.harley-davidson.com/browse/browse_categories.jsp?asst=MotorClothes/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2010) (selling items such as sunglasses, accessories, and loungewear).
12
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product-related content are less profitable in the current market economy.18
In addition, to achieve the status of a leading brand, extensions are a
necessity, rather than an option. Extending a brand far from its primary
product demonstrates that the brand can be detached from its specific
product area and operate as an independent entity.
Brand extensions into distant product fields, known as collateral
markets, are thus an integral part of brand fetishism. Yet, trademark law
extensively supports and encourages this commercial practice. Famous
trademarks are protected today in virtually every product field. For
example, “Hallmark,” when used for an auto dealership, was found to
infringe “Hallmark,” as applied to greeting cards,19 and owners of the
“Lexus” automobile mark successfully sought injunction of the use of the
mark on personal care products.20
Moreover, trademark law privileges marks that have been extended
into collateral markets by granting them stronger legal protection. For
instance, the mark “Harley-Hog” for pork was denied registration, because
Harley-Davidson had used its marks for a wide variety of collateral
products, including beer, wine coolers, chocolate bars, and more. The
court concluded that a consumer having knowledge of these brand
extensions would conclude that “Harley-Hog” pork products originate
from Harley-Davidson.21
Meanwhile, when licensing their marks into collateral markets,
trademark owners usually do not engage in quality control programs. They
have no expertise in these product fields and are not in a position to specify
quality standards or to exercise meaningful quality control over their
licensees.22 A trademark in collateral markets thus does not serve to
provide product information and conserve consumer search costs—the
trademark owner is not the origin of goods in any meaningful sense.
Rather, the primary function of a trademark in such cases is merely to
exploit its psychological influence on the consumer.
Trademark licensors are often exempted from tort liability for
defective products of their licensees in collateral markets.23 The legal
system thus approves of the commercial practice of licensing the
trademarked symbol as a mere trigger for purchase, without requiring the
trademark owner to stand behind the licensed products in any meaningful
way. This amounts to an explicit endorsement of brand fetishism.
18

AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154.
Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990, 998–99 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
20
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Natural Health Trends Corp., No. CV 04-9028 DSF (Ex),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10442, at *16–17 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2005).
21
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 863 (T.T.A.B.
1986).
22
See infra text accompanying note 302.
23
See infra text accompanying notes 210–11.
19
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As the example of collateral markets demonstrates, brand fetishism
tends to strip trademarks of their informative content, transforming them
into mere tools of psychological influence. Therefore, by supporting brand
fetishism, trademark law acts contrary to its fundamental economic
rationales.
After first arguing that brand fetishism—and its accompanying legal
protection—distorts the primary economic function of trademarks, this
Article examines whether there are alternative rationales for supporting
brand fetishism. For instance, some trademarks serve as social tools of
interpersonal communication, and at times are even used to satisfy spiritual
needs of the consumers. Nonetheless, this Article demonstrates that these
new functions of trademarks cannot provide an alternative basis for
expanding legal protection.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the trend toward
brand fetishism; Part III discusses how trademark law should react to this
modern commercial reality; Part IV is dedicated to surveying the various
mechanisms in trademark law that support and encourage brand fetishism;
Part V examines whether there are alternative rationales for supporting
brand fetishism; and finally, the conclusion suggests that trademark law
should act to demystify brands and to restore their primary function—
indicating the product’s origin and quality.
II. BRAND FETISHISM
A. Background: Fetishism of Commodities and Trademark Law
A “fetish” is an object believed to have magical or supernatural
powers.24 “Fetishism” is the “veneration of objects believed to have
magical or supernatural potency.”25 In 1867, Karl Marx borrowed this
anthropological terminology to describe a phenomenon he famously
entitled “fetishism of commodities.” “Fetishism of commodities” is the
state of affairs in a capitalist market, in which products are perceived as
“commodities”—entities having an inherent value—whereas in fact their
value is created by human labor.26 Marx argued that this mystification of
commodities bears great similarity to the religious beliefs of primitive
societies, in which objects produced by human labor appear as independent
24

THE HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 360 (Jonathan Z. Smith et al., eds., 1995).
Fetishism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
205502/fetishism (last visited September 25, 2010).
26
1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 165 (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1990) (1867) (“There the
products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which
enters into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities
with the products of men’s hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of
labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production
of commodities.”).
25
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beings endowed with life. This perception of commodities emerged in
the late nineteenth century against the background of the late Industrial
Revolution—the rise of mass mechanical production and rapid distribution
disconnected the goods from their producers, or, in Marx’s terms, led to
“alienation.”28
At the same time, against the same economic backdrop, trademark law
emerged in Europe and in the United States.29 In a market of goods
detached from their producers, it was necessary to create a mechanism that
would allow the consumer to identify and distinguish the products of
various manufacturers.30 Thus trademark law was born to protect
trademarks as indications of the origin of goods. In their early years,
trademarks were thought to represent the physical source of manufacture.
Under this “source theory,” trademark licensing and assignment were
viewed as philosophically impossible without the transfer of the entire
business.31 The “source theory” accorded with the commodity fetishism of
Marx’s times: a trademark indicated the owner of the factory as the
meaningful source of the products, obscuring and devaluating the labor of
the workers that stood behind these products.
In the late 1910s, courts began to gradually soften the “source theory,”
recognizing the possibility of licensing and selling trademarks without
transferring the entire business. The new approach claimed that a
trademark should connote a “single, albeit anonymous source.”32 That is, a
trademark should not necessarily indicate the physical origin of the goods;
it should solely communicate the message that all goods carrying the mark

27

Id. at 163–65.
Id. at 203–04.
29
The first volume of Capital was published in 1867. Some of the first trademark laws were
passed around the same time. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Trade Mark Registration Act
was passed in 1875, Bass Feels a Bitter Draught, INDEP. (London), Sept. 27, 1998, at 30; in France, the
Manufacture and Goods Mark Act was enacted in 1857, The IP Guide to . . . France, NEW LEGAL
REV., (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.cpaglobal.com/newlegalreview/1175/the_ip_guide_to_france; and in
the United States, the Federal Trade Mark Act was enacted in 1870, Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16
Stat. 198. The Federal Trade Mark Act was held unconstitutional in 1879. In re Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879).
30
See Patricia K. Fletcher, Comment, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value
of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297, 302 (1982) (“From the English middle ages . . .
through the nineteenth century, local businesses dominated the marketplace. The consumer and
manufacturer were in close proximity. Thus, the consumer was familiar with the identity, size,
location, and reputation of the local manufacturers from which he bought goods. . . . The technological
advances of the industrial revolution, particularly in communication and transportation, caused the
consumer and manufacturer to become distant. . . . The consumer no longer knew the identity of the
producer of goods, and manufacturers recognized the resulting necessity of trademark use as a means
of distinguishing their goods from those of competitors.” (footnotes omitted)).
31
E.g., Am. Broad. Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1941); MacMahan Pharmacal
Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474–75 (8th Cir. 1901); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:39 (3d ed. 1992).
32
See, e.g., MCCARTHY, id. § 3:9.
28
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are somehow linked with or sponsored by a single corporation.33 This
view was later complemented by the “quality theory”: beginning in the
1930s, courts and legal scholars increasingly recognized that the most
important function of a trademark is not its ability to denote the physical
origin of goods, but its ability to indicate that all goods bearing the same
mark have the same attributes and the same quality.34 In other words, the
consumer does not care about the physical origin of goods, as long as the
quality of the goods is consistent. The “anonymous source theory” and the
“quality theory” were codified into trademark law with the passage of the
Lanham Act in 1946.35
The “anonymous source theory” and the “quality theory” advanced
commodity fetishism into a level unimaginable in Marx’s time. The
“anonymous source theory” transformed the source of the product into an
extremely abstract and amorphous concept, whereas the “quality theory”
affirmed that the real, physical source of manufacture was an entirely
insignificant aspect of the product. That is, trademark law explicitly
recognized that a consumer should not be concerned with whether the
sneakers she buys were produced by a well-paid American worker laboring
under high standard working conditions or by a child subject to labor abuse
in a Vietnamese sweatshop. As long as the trademark tells her it is a Nike
sneaker, she can assume that the sneaker is somehow linked with or
sponsored by the same corporation as other Nike sneakers. Thus, she can
expect consistent quality, which is legally regarded as the only significant
concern for her.
It is important to note that absent the development of the “anonymous
source theory” and the “quality theory” in trademark law, this high level of
commodity fetishism would have been impossible. Thus, trademark law
was an essential tool that allowed the public perception of a product as a
commodity—an object in its own right, independent from the human labor
that created it—to reach its epitome.
B. The Emergence of Brand Fetishism
Since the invention of the “anonymous source theory” and the “quality
theory,” trademarks have advanced further along the fetishistic scale.
33

Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 962–63 (2d Cir. 1918); Manhattan
Shirt Co. v. Sarnoff-Irving Hat Stores, Inc., 164 A. 246, 250 (Del. Ch. 1933); MCCARTHY, supra note
31, § 3:9.
34
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 3:10, 18:40.
35
Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051–1127 (1946)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006) (stating that a mark may be used legitimately by
“related companies” and such use shall not affect the validity of the mark); id. § 1127 (defining a
“related company” as “any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with
respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is
used”).
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The twentieth century saw a plethora of technological developments,
resulting in an enormous growth of mass production. The Western
economy seemed to finally have reached its ultimate goal of satisfying the
material needs of the great majority of the population.36 Nevertheless,
production remained the central measure of progress and national welfare,
and constant market growth became the mythical aspiration of the modern
economy.37 To achieve this goal, demand had to grow constantly as well.
Hence, starting in the 1920s, corporations gradually shifted their attention
and resources from the production of material goods to the production of
consumer desires.38 The need to inspire imagination and provoke emotions
in order to sell mass-produced products became common wisdom.39
Trademarks, as mere indications of product quality, could no longer
survive in this new commercial reality. At this point, they evolved into
brands.40 Brands were the platforms employed to attach feelings and
images to physical commodities. They were the primary means of
establishing emotional bonds and loyalty relationships with consumers in a
market saturated with goods.41 Brands extended the products, adding
symbolic dimensions to the physical items.42 However, as suggestive
marketing became widespread, emotion-laden brands became
36
See KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM 59 (1999) (arguing that in the postwar years the American
Dream seemed to have been achieved: a chicken in every pot, a car in every driveway); VANCE
PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 21 (1957) (“One big and intimidating obstacle confronting the
stimulators was the fact that most Americans already possessed perfectly usable stoves, cars, TV sets,
clothes, etc.”).
37
See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 41–42 (1998)
(suggesting that productivity has the social function of a myth; comparing production and growth to
black magic); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 102–03 (1958) (discussing the
reduction in risk that accompanies the growth of the modern corporation).
38
See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, CON$UMED: HOW MARKETS CORRUPT CHILDREN, INFANTILIZE
ADULTS, AND SWALLOW CITIZENS WHOLE 177–78 (2007) (describing the transition of capitalism
“from a system that serviced wants to a system that produced wants”); GALBRAITH, supra note 37, at
127 (arguing that corporations create consumers’ desires for the goods they produce); PACKARD, supra
note 36, at 22 (quoting an ad executive as saying “[w]hat makes this country great is the creation of
wants and desires, the creation of dissatisfaction with the old and outmoded”).
39
See, e.g., Douglas B. Holt, Why Do Brands Cause Trouble? A Dialectical Theory of Consumer
Culture and Branding, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 70, 87 (2002) (“Brands that create worlds that strike
consumers’ imaginations, that inspire and provoke and stimulate, that help them interpret the world that
surrounds them, will earn kudos and profits.”); Craig J. Thompson et al., Emotional Branding and the
Strategic Value of the Doppelgänger Brand Image, 70 J. MARKETING 50, 50 (2006) (“Over the past
decade, emotional branding has emerged as a highly influential brand management paradigm.”).
40
See BARBER, supra note 38, at 177–78 (“Trademarks were only a way station on the road to
brands, however. For trademarks still hued fairly closely to generic products and services and would
prove insufficient to the task of awakening desires . . . . Brands were born . . . .”); KEVIN ROBERTS,
LOVEMARKS: THE FUTURE BEYOND BRANDS 29–30 (2006) (“Brands were developed to create
differences for products that were in danger of becoming as hard to tell apart as chunks of gravel.”).
41
BARBER, supra note 38, at 178–79 (“Where trademarks traded in generic goods, brands traded
in generic sentiments, emotions which had little to do with the goods and services themselves but were
surgically attached to them by professional market doctors.”).
42
See Burleigh B. Gardner & Sidney J. Levy, The Product and the Brand, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1955, at 33, 35 (asserting that a brand has a “public image,” which plays an important role
in purchasing decisions).
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commonplace as well. Faced with fierce image competition, brands could
no longer sustain consumer loyalty.43 By the 1980s, brands were in serious
trouble.44
At that time, new marketing concepts began to emerge. Marketing
experts increasingly recognized that a brand should represent a consistent
set of values and ideals, rather than vague emotions and associations.
Advertising executives started talking about the need to create a “brand
identity,” “brand personality,” “brand character,” “brand DNA,” “brand
equity,” and most dramatically, “brand soul.”45 Today it is already a
widely accepted notion in marketing literature that a brand should resemble
a human being, complete with a distinctive and coherent set of
characteristics.46
Research has found that consumer satisfaction is not a predictor of
consumer loyalty and that the correlation between satisfaction and loyalty
is very weak.47 Customers are much more loyal to a brand when their
loyalty is based not on rational reasoning, but on emotional preference.48
A consumer who considers factors such as product quality, when
preferring one brand over another, is more likely than an emotionally
attached consumer to switch brands when these factors change.49
Therefore, as marketing literature advises, loyalty is best achieved by
creating quasi-personal relations between the consumer and the brand.50
Consumer loyalty should be based on a strong emotional attachment,
43

See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 35–36 (describing brands as “running out of juice”).
See KLEIN, supra note 3, at 12–15 (describing a sharp decline of brand loyalty and the
emergence of “brand blindness” in the 1980s and 1990s).
45
See, e.g., AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 7–11 (suggesting a new strategy for
brand management, “brand leadership,” with one of the major tasks being to build a clear and elaborate
brand identity and personality); JEAN-NOËL KAPFERER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT 42–48
(1992) (developing the concept of “brand identity” with six facets: physique, personality, relationship,
culture, reflection, and self-image); SAL RANDAZZO, MYTHMAKING ON MADISON AVENUE 17 (1993)
(“The brand’s soul is its spiritual center . . . that defines the brand and permeates all other aspects of the
brand.”); Tom Kelly, Brand Essence—Making Our Brands Last Longer, 5 J. BRAND MGMT. 390, 390–
91 (1998) (discussing brand “DNA”).
46
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Aaker, Dimensions of Brand Personality, 34 J. MARKETING RES. 347,
347–48 (1997) (developing a framework of brand personality dimensions).
47
KEKI R. BHOTE, BEYOND CUSTOMER SATISFACTION TO CUSTOMER LOYALTY 30–32 (1996).
48
See C.N. Allen, A Psychology of Motivation for Advertisers, 25 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 378, 383
(1941) (describing the futility of rationalizing an emotional brand choice); Amitai Etzioni, How
Rational We?, 2 SOC. F. 1, 10 (1987) (“Brand loyalty is another phenomenon that suggests non-rational
commitment: people buy products to which they develop a commitment even in face of evidence that
the products are no longer the ‘best buy.’”).
49
Assaf, supra note 8, at 68–69.
50
MARC GOBÉ, EMOTIONAL BRANDING: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR CONNECTING BRANDS TO
PEOPLE xiv–xv, xxvii–xxxii (2001) (“Emotional Branding is the conduit by which people connect
subliminally with companies and their products in an emotionally profound way.”); DARYL TRAVIS,
EMOTIONAL BRANDING: HOW SUCCESSFUL BRANDS GAIN THE IRRATIONAL EDGE 53–54 (2000) (“A
transaction is like a one-night stand, and it’s never going to be as satisfying or rewarding as falling in
love. A transaction makes the cash register ring once. A relationship makes it ring again and again.”);
Thompson et al., supra note 39, at 51 (“Thus, the strategic objective of emotional branding is to forge
strong and meaningful affective bonds with consumers.”).
44
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51

preferably feelings of love, towards the brand. Marketing expert Kevin
Roberts contends that a consumer’s love toward the brand renders loyalty
beyond reason.52 A related vein of marketing research suggests that brand
strategists should unearth the values and ideals that consumers strive to
fulfill, and then imbue their brand with these values and ideals.53 The
brand should provide the consumer with a means of self-expression, selfidentification, and self-actualization; it should serve as a conduit for the
consumer to create her own lifestyle.54
A relatively recent trend in marketing literature goes so far as to
encourage corporations to create “brand cults,”55 “brand communities,”56
and “brand religion.”57 Brand cults and brand communities are believed to
breed consumer loyalty in its strongest form, to inspire religious-like
devotion.58
Corresponding studies in the field of consumer research demonstrate
that marketing experts were not unsuccessful in their missions. People can
recognize “brand personalities”: they attribute values and ideals to
commercial products represented by brands.59 Thus, a soft drink can
represent noble ideals such as tolerance and open-mindedness.60 Brands
are believed to have traits and character, distinct from those of the
corporate management; brand devotees sometimes even complain that the
corporation does not have a proper understanding of its own brand.61
51
ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 56–57 (“I became convinced that only an emotion like Love could
power the next evolution of branding.”); TRAVIS, supra note 50, at 53–54.
52
ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 66.
53
DOUGLAS B. HOLT, HOW BRANDS BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL BRANDING
3–4 (2004) (“Acting as vessels of self-expression, the brands are imbued with stories that consumers
find valuable in constructing their identities.”); Holt, supra note 39, at 80 (“One of the first branding
gurus, Earnest Elmo Calkins, developed the idea that manufacturers should strive to position their
brands as concrete expressions of valued social and moral ideals.”).
54
See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 53, at 3–4; Ian Phau & Kong Cheen Lau, Conceptualizing Brand
Personality: A Review and Research Propositions, 9 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR
MARKETING 52, 52 (2000) (“Brands are perceived to possess a personality that consumers use as an
avenue for self-expression . . . .”); Thompson et al., supra note 39, at 51 (“[B]rand strategists should
focus on telling stories that inspire and captivate consumers. These stories must demonstrate a genuine
understanding of consumers’ lifestyles, dreams, and goals and compellingly represent how the brand
can enrich their lives.”).
55
DOUGLAS ATKIN, THE CULTING OF BRANDS 106–10 (2004).
56
Id. at 58; James H. McAlexander et al., Building Brand Community, 66 J. MARKETING 38, 38
(2002).
57
KUNDE, supra note 14, at 47–95.
58
ATKIN, supra note 55, at 67–73; McAlexander et al., supra note 56, at 43–51; Albert M. Muñiz,
Jr. & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 412, 427 (2001).
59
ATKIN, supra note 55, at 106–10 (describing an experiment in which people were divided into
groups according to their favorite brands of soft drinks and asked to write manifestos for their brands;
the manifestos clearly articulated a well-differentiated worldview for the brands).
60
Id. at 108 (noting that SoBe drinkers mentioned these ideals as part of the value system of the
brand).
61
Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 424 (noting that members of the Saab and Apple brand
communities “often feel that they have a better understanding of the brand than the manufacturer
does”). For a most extreme example of this phenomenon, see Albert M. Muñiz, Jr. & Hope Jensen
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Research shows that brands can serve as viable relationship partners for
consumers. Relations between consumers and brands are characterized in
terms of intimacy, interdependence, commitment, love, and passion.62
Several studies confirm that consumers incorporate brands into their
lives as tools for shaping and expressing their own identities, and for
perceiving the identities of others.63 Some brands even serve as objects of
cults and rituals, and their followers form “brand communities”; Apple,
Saab, Bronco, and Harley-Davidson are the most prominent examples.64
Mac users and Saab drivers regard brand community members who switch
brands as having “betrayed the brotherhood.”65 The Harley-Davidson
brand has been described as being so powerful as to be “in effect, a
religious icon around which an entire ideology of consumption is
articulated.”66 Many Harley-Davidson devotees even tattoo the revered
logo onto their bodies.67
As this Article proceeds, the term “brand fetishism” will be used to
signify the phenomenon described above: brand fetishism refers to the
trend of accepting brands as spiritual beings, which can possess
personalities and human characteristics, embed ideals and values, serve as
Schau, Religiosity in the Abandoned Apple Newton Brand Community, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 737
(2005) (exploring a brand community centered on the Apple Newton, a product that was abandoned by
its manufacturer).
62
Noël Albert et al., When Consumers Love Their Brands: Exploring the Concept and Its
Dimensions, 61 J. BUS. RES. 1062, 1063 (2008) (detailing empirical research which examines the
feelings of love toward brands); Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing
Relationship Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343 (1998) (describing an empirical
and theoretical study developing a comprehensive framework for characterizing consumer-brand
relationships).
63
Russell W. Belk et al., The Sacred and the Profane in Consumer Behavior: Theodicy on the
Odyssey, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 15 (1989) (noting that Chevrolet devotees characterize themselves as
“Chevy people,” as opposed to “Ford” people); Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 420, 423
(describing how Macintosh users feel superior to the “IBM herd”); Ronald W. Pimentel & Kristy E.
Reynolds, A Model for Consumer Devotion: Affective Commitment with Proactive Sustaining
MARKETING
SCI.
REV.,
2004,
at
1,
24,
available
at
Behaviors,
ACAD.
http://www.amsreview.org/articles/pimentel05-2004.pdf (“[C]onsumers report that their own values are
similar to the perceived values of the brand . . . .”).
64
Søren Askegaard, Brands as a Global Ideoscape, in BRAND CULTURE 91, 94–96 (Jonathan E.
Schroeder & Miriam Salzer-Mörling eds., 2006) (discussing brand communities, noting that brands are
taking on religious dimensions); Jonathan M.T. Balmer, Corporate Brand Cultures and Communities,
in BRAND CULTURE, supra, at 34, 39 (asserting that brand communities are similar to faith groups);
Robert V. Kozinets, Utopian Enterprise: Articulating the Meanings of Star Trek’s Culture of
Consumption, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 67, 68 (2001) (discussing the Star Trek brand community);
McAlexander et al., supra note 56, at 38 (describing Jeep and Harley Davidson brand communities);
Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 412 (describing the brand communities centered around Ford
Bronco, Macintosh, and Saab); Muñiz & Schau, supra note 61, at 737 (describing the Apple Newton
brand community).
65
Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 424–25.
66
Schouten & McAlexander, supra note 4, at 53; see also MARTIN LINDSTROM, BUY-OLOGY:
TRUTH AND LIES ABOUT WHY WE BUY 123–26 (2008) (describing a brain scan study, which
demonstrated that brands such as Coca-Cola, Harley-Davidson, and iPod generate similar emotions to
those inspired by religious symbols).
67
MATT HAIG, BRAND FAILURES 78 (2003).
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relationship partners, and provide sources of ritual and community.
C. Brand Fetishism Deepens
As time went on, marketing experts came to believe that the emotional
dimension of a commodity is not merely an additional feature that
differentiates the core product from its counterparts and enhances its value.
They came to believe that the emotional dimension is actually more
important than the product itself.68 Marketing literature suggests that in the
modern market, products have little material differences;69 many
companies can produce good products,70 and almost any innovative
product has cheaper imitations.71 Therefore, as marketing experts advise,
corporations should move beyond product benefits and think about the
meaning system their brands represent.72 Commodity competition—that
is, competition based on material product differences—and price
competition are regarded as worst case scenarios for a corporation.73 The
prevalent marketing literature asserts that the only alternative is to build
strong brands, brands that offer an opportunity to charge premium prices
without offering superior products.74
Many successful corporations increasingly view products as means of
entering the market of spiritual, symbolic competition.75 Nike CEO Phil
Knight stated:
For years, we thought of ourselves as a productionoriented company, meaning we put all our emphasis on
designing and manufacturing the product. But now we
68
GOBÉ, supra note 50, at xiv (“I believe that it is the emotional aspect of products . . . that will
be the key difference between consumers’ ultimate choice and the price that they will pay.”); KLEIN,
supra note 3, at 21 (“In the new model . . . the product always takes a back seat to the real product, the
brand.”); KUNDE, supra note 14, at 2–3, 9–10, 48–49 (“Emotional values are replacing physical
attributes as the fundamental market influence.”).
69
ATKIN, supra note 55, at xii, 96; LINDSTROM, supra note 66, at 122 (“Once, when visiting a
factory in China, I discovered that the factory tables were packed with one brand of clothing in the
morning, another brand in the afternoon. The only difference: the cotton logo, which, as a finishing
touch, workers placed carefully on each shirt, sweater, and hoodie, creating the sole, and staggering,
price differential between branded shirts and unbranded ones.”).
70
KUNDE, supra note 14, at 109.
71
ATKIN, supra note 55, at 96.
72
Id. at 119; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 130.
73
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 14–16 (suggesting that the only option for a
corporation in the face of price competition is to build brands); KLEIN, supra note 3, at 14 (describing
the annual meeting of the U.S. Association of National Advertisers in 1988, during which the chairman
berated the assembled executives for stopping to participate in “a commodity marketplace” rather than
an image-based one); ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 29–30 (“For anyone in business, the rapid cycling of
their valued products into generic stuff is a dark and constant fear.”).
74
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 14–16; ATKIN, supra note 55, at 109–10
(arguing that brands can be “an opportunity to charge a premium without relying on the vicissitudes of
product superiority”).
75
See ATKIN, supra note 55, at 96 (discussing how corporations build meaning around their
brands).
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understand that the most important thing we do is market
the product. We’ve come around to saying that Nike is a
marketing-oriented company, and the product is our most
important marketing tool.76
Marketing consultant Douglas Atkin explains that every company has the
opportunity to gain strong brand loyalty, even if its product is not
especially competitive—“just remember that emotional attachment trumps
rational analysis.”77 The success of the iPod can illustrate this argument.
When designing the iPod, Apple merely replicated already-existing
technology, but its very successful marketing campaign led Apple to
market dominance, while the pioneering companies have faded into
oblivion.78
To a certain extent, we already live in a symbolic economy, where the
illusory spirit of the brand is valued higher than the physical products.
Strong brands are often valued at many times above the book value of the
corporations that own them.79 Many successful corporations, such as
Tommy Hilfiger and Nike, largely leave the task of manufacturing
products to other companies, and concentrate all their efforts on the most
important task—creating and maintaining strong brands.80 As Naomi
Klein notes,
Tommy Hilfiger . . . is less in the business of
manufacturing clothes than he is in the business of signing
his name. The company is run entirely through licensing
agreements, with Hilfiger commissioning all its products
from a group of other companies: Jockey International
makes Hilfiger underwear, Pepe Jeans London makes
Hilfiger jeans, Oxford Industries make Tommy shirts, the
Stride Rite Corporation makes its footwear. What does
Tommy Hilfiger manufacture? Nothing at all.81
Often the reality behind the brand is less important than the illusory
world it embodies. For example, the Volvo brand may connote Sweden,
though Volvo cars are exclusively manufactured by the American
company, Ford.82 Ben & Jerry’s ice cream may suggest environmental and
76

BARBER, supra note 38, at 179.
ATKIN, supra note 55, at 202; see also KUNDE, supra note 14, at 52 (making a similar
argument).
78
Ivan Abel, From Technology Imitation to Market Dominance: The Case of iPod, 18
COMPETITIVENESS REV. 257, 263–64 (2008).
79
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 18 (noting that BMW, Nike, Apple, and IKEA
were found to have brand value over seventy-five percent of the firm’s market value); Balmer, supra
note 64, at 38 (stating that, at the time of its buyout by Philip Morris, the Kraft mark was valued at six
times more than the book value of the company that owned it); Magid et al., supra note 13, at 8–9
(noting that over ninety percent of the value of the Coca-Cola Company is attributed to its marks).
80
ATKIN, supra note 55, at 96, 119; KLEIN, supra note 3, at 24.
81
KLEIN, supra note 3, at 28.
82
Balmer, supra note 64, at 41–45.
77
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ethical values, though the company was acquired by the Unilever
conglomerate, which does not have a strong pedigree in environmental or
ethical concerns.83
The symbolic dimension of consumption is growing ever more
important. It is ever easier to indicate the brand of one’s clothing,
footwear, cars, drinks, etc. Products and brands sometimes even change
roles. For instance, several clothing industry brands have increased the
size of their labels exponentially; likewise, labels have migrated from their
original inconspicuous location inside the collar to the outside of the
garment, exposed to all and sundry.84 Brands, once merely a symbolic
extension of products, become in such cases the essence, and the products
become secondary, material extensions of the brands.85 Rather than
identifying the product, conspicuously displayed brands have come to
identify the consumer herself.86
Two additional phenomena constitute an integral part of the tendency
toward brand fetishism: brand extensions and brand merchandising. These
phenomena will be discussed in the following two sections.
D. Brand Extensions
Corporations have long recognized that strong brands provide an
opportunity for “extension”: a brand’s reputation can be exploited to
launch new products. The stronger brands became, the more corporations
were tempted to extend them. By the 1980s, when corporations began
imbuing brands with personalities and souls,87 brand extensions turned into
a guiding business strategy. Over half of the new products introduced in
that decade were extensions of existing brands.88 Since then, a growing
body of marketing literature has emerged, trying to explore the enigma of
successful brand extensions.89 If successful, a brand extension results not
only in profits gained from the new product; it also enhances the value of

83
Id. at 45. Unilever is a multi-national conglomerate that owns a great number of brands in
various product fields, including Knorr, Lipton, Dove, Axe, and many others. Our Brands, UNILEVER,
http://www.unilever.com/brands/?WT.GNAV=Our_brands (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
84
KLEIN, supra note 3, at 28.
85
BARBER, supra note 38, at 178–79; KLEIN, supra note 3, at 28; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 102;
Askegaard, supra note 64, at 100.
86
BARBER, supra note 38, at 194, 198; HOLT, supra note 53, at 3–4; Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra
note 58, at 420.
87
See supra Part II.B.
88
Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand Extensions
Have a Negative Impact?, 57 J. MARKETING 71, 71 (1993); Dennis A. Pitta & Lea Prevel Katsanis,
Understanding Brand Equity for Successful Brand Extension, 12 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 51, 51
(1995).
89
See infra notes 92–95.
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the core brand.90 A poor brand extension, however, will not only decrease
demand for the new product, but can also dilute and damage the core
brand.91
During the 1980s and the early 1990s, researchers held a rather
straightforward view of extensions: the greater the similarity between the
core product of the brand and the newly-introduced product, the more
likely the extension is to succeed.92 This seems to be intuitive. The more
similar the products, the more the consumer is likely to assume that the
skill that stands behind the core product can be successfully applied to the
new one.
But, this approach hardly serves to explain reality, in which the
extension of the Virgin brand from music to airlines and cola succeeded,
whereas the extension of the Cadillac brand to a less expensive “Cimarron”
car model failed.93 Hence, marketing studies have attempted to provide
additional insights into the mysterious terrain of brand extensions. A new
strand of research draws upon Murphy and Medin’s theory on
categorization thought94 as a framework for evaluating brand extensions.95
According to this theory, people associate objects by categories. A
category is based on a mental concept that can be something other than
object similarity. Therefore, a mental category can tie together seemingly
dissimilar objects.96 Applying this theory to the field of brand extensions,
researchers concluded that what is most important for a successful
extension is to understand the concept of the brand in the consumer’s
mind—the extension should accord with this concept.97 Empirical
90
David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 54 J.
MARKETING 27, 27 (1990); Lorraine Sunde & Roderick J. Brodie, Consumer Evaluations of Brand
Extensions: Further Empirical Results, 10 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 47, 53 (1993).
91
Loken & John, supra note 88, at 71; C. Whan Park et al., The Effects of Direct and Associative
Brand Extension Strategies on Consumer Response to Brand Extensions, 20 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER
RES. 28, 28–30 (1993).
92
Aaker & Keller, supra note 90, at 27; David M. Boush & Barbara Loken, A Process-Tracing
Study of Brand Extension Evaluation, 28 J. MARKETING RES. 16, 16 (1991); David M. Boush et al.,
Consumer Behavior Seminar, Univ. of Minn., Affect Generalization to Similar and Dissimilar Brand
Extensions, 4 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 225, 226 (1987).
93
Pitta & Katsanis, supra note 88, at 51 (“While the Cimarron was not actually a failure it did
cast a shadow on the core product. The model was popular in a market segment which could not afford
luxury sized Cadillacs. Owners of luxury sized models lost their sense of the car’s exclusivity.”).
94
Gregory L. Murphy & Douglas L. Medin, The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, 92
PSYCHOL. REV. 289, 291–97 (1985).
95
Subodh Bhat & Srinivas K. Reddy, Investigating the Dimensions of the Fit Between a Brand
and Its Extension, in MARKETING THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, PROC. OF THE AM. MARKETING ASS’N
WINTER EDUCATORS’ CONF. 186 (Debbie Thorne LeClair & Michael Hartline eds., 1997); Broniarczyk
& Alba, supra note 16, at 215–16; Park et al., supra note 14, at 186.
96
Murphy & Medin, supra note 94, at 289.
97
See, e.g., Aaker & Keller, supra note 90, at 29 (“[T]he transfer of the perceived quality of a
brand will be enhanced when the two product classes in some way fit together.”); Bhat & Reddy, supra
note 95, at 186 (“Consumers’ view of a brand as a mental category and how this view affects extension
evaluation seems to be, by far, the most popular explanatory framework used by extension
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evidence shows that brand associations are a more influential factor for a
successful extension than product similarity.98 An illustrative example is
the failed attempt to extend the Heinz brand to cleaning vinegar.99 While
the company already produced and sold vinegar, consumers perceived the
Heinz brand as a brand of a food manufacturer and refused to accept its
extension to a non-edible cleaning product.100
Studies suggest a distinction between “prestige brands” and
“functional brands.” While functional brands are perceived in terms of
product performance aspects, prestige brands are primarily perceived in
terms of image.101 People employ different concepts when categorizing
prestige brands and functional brands: though they readily identify
common associations behind prestige brands of very different products,
such as Mercedes and Lenox, they are not able to find any concept uniting
functional brands of dissimilar products, such as Sony and Xerox.102 In the
same vein, Benjamin Barber argues that Nike today competes with Disney
rather than with Reebok.103
Consequently, it was found that extensions of different brands are
evaluated differently by consumers, depending on the concept behind the
brand. The more generic a brand concept is, the more extendible it is, and
the less it is tied to a physical product.104 Brands closely tied to a product
category, such as Campbell’s Soup, A-1 Steak Sauce, Kleenex, Clorox
Bleach, or Chiquita, cannot be extended too far.105 For instance, Chiquita’s
attempts to extend from bananas to juices failed twice.106 By contrast,
consumers readily accept extensions of a prestige brand into very distant
fields.107 Brands with high imaginary content, such as Harley-Davidson,
Jaguar, Armani, and Virgin, are not restrained by product categories.108
Thus, Harley-Davidson now sells sunglasses, hair accessories, and
underwear; Jaguar markets perfume, lipstick, and body lotion; Armani has
been extended from clothes to sunglasses, watches, jewelry, fragrance, and
researchers.”); Park et al., supra note 14, at 185 (presenting a study that examines the differences
between successful and unsuccessful brand extensions).
98
See Broniarczyk & Alba, supra note 16, at 226–27 (examining the results of a study that shows
the importance of brand association versus category similiarity); Glynn & Brodie, supra note 16, at 509
(describing the replication of the Broniarczyk & Alba study with supporting results).
99
HAIG, supra note 67, at 87–89.
100
Id.
101
Park et al., supra note 14, at 186.
102
Id. at 192.
103
BARBER, supra note 38, at 178.
104
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 81; Park et
al., supra note 14, at 186.
105
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 81; Park et
al., supra note 14, at 186.
106
HAIG, supra note 67, at 103–05.
107
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55; Broniarczyk & Alba, supra note 16, at
221–23; Glynn & Brodie, supra note 16, at 509.
108
KUNDE, supra note 14, at 19.
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even televisions; and Virgin has been extended from music to airlines, soft
drinks, vodka, credit cards, and mobile phones.109
Sometimes a brand is evaluated differently by different consumers.
Consumers who have a “functional relationship” with a brand, that is,
perceive it merely as a carrier of product information, respond more
negatively to brand extensions than consumers who have an “emotional
relationship” with the brand.110
Ironically, trademarks with a high informative, product-related content
are therefore less profitable in the current market economy.111 To be a
leader brand is to communicate spirit and soul, rather than product-related
skill and expertise. Just as under the reign of the advanced commodity
fetishism, trademarks ceased to identify the physical origin of manufacture
and started indicating a single, albeit anonymous source in the era of brand
fetishism, the most successful trademarks no longer connote product
information, but a “distinct, albeit abstract, set of associations.”112
What is more interesting, however, is that to achieve the status of a
leading brand, extensions are no longer an option but a necessity. If a
brand sticks to one product category, it is likely to become a functional
brand, no matter how much marketing was employed to create its spirit.
Restriction to one product category may reduce the meaning of the brand
to a simple identification of commodities. Analyzing Levi’s decreasing
market share, Jennifer Steinhauser notes: “Maybe one of Levi’s problems
is that it has no cola. It has no denim-toned house paint. Levi makes what
is essentially a commodity: blue jeans. Its ads may evoke rugged
outdoorsmanship, but Levi hasn’t promoted any particular life style to sell
other products.”113 Brand extensions are indispensable to ensure that the
brand conveys a larger concept than mere physical products—a concept
that can be applied to diverse product areas. A brand extension
demonstrates that the brand can detach from its specific product area and
operate as an independent entity.
E. Brand Merchandising
Merchandising is the practice of licensing trademarks to be printed as
decorative elements on T-shirts, posters, cups, and the like. Astronomical
sums are paid in merchandising agreements solely for the right to stamp
109
Christina Binkley, Like Our Sunglasses? Try Our Vodka! Brand Extensions Get Weirder,
Risking Customer Confusion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2007, at D1.
110
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 155.
111
Id. at 154; see also KUNDE, supra note 14, at 63 (asserting that once a “Brand Religion” is
created, the company can sell all sorts of products under its unified umbrella).
112
Peter A. Dacin & Daniel C. Smith, The Effect of Brand Portfolio Characteristics on Consumer
Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 229, 231 (1994).
113
Jennifer Steinhauer, Design for Living; That’s Not a Skim Latte. It’s a Way of Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at 5.

102

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:83

114

the brand name or logo on such goods.
Royalties from merchandising
licenses sometimes even exceed the income from the company’s sales.115
Brand merchandising is connected to the trend whereby brands are
becoming more easily recognizable. Brand merchandise, however, is more
than that; drinking a Coke or riding a Harley-Davidson motorcycle
certainly has a symbolic dimension. Hanging a Coca-Cola poster in one’s
bedroom or wearing a Harley-Davidson T-shirt, however, has only a
symbolic dimension. Such activities demonstrate that some consumers
have largely internalized the idea of brands as independent spiritual beings
which can be liberated from any connection with material goods. By
wearing a brand T-shirt or hanging a brand poster, the consumer admits
that he or she is no longer concerned with the product that the brand sells.
In buying brand merchandising, he or she evokes the brand’s spirit without
any product-related substance.
This is not to say, however, that such a consumer will not purchase the
core products of the brand; the converse is true. In his classic book, David
A. Aaker describes five levels of brand loyalty, the highest level being
“committed consumer.”116 The ultimate “committed customer” is “the
Harley-Davidson rider who wears the Harley symbol as a tattoo.”117
Pimentel and Reynolds further suggest that “[t]he devoted consumer will
display the brand logo on items from product categories different from that
of the branded product, such as the logo of an automobile company on a Tshirt. They will seek opportunities to acquire and exhibit the logo—not
necessarily in connection with consuming the product.”118
Marketing literature regards consumers who buy brand merchandise as
consumers who have reached the highest level of devotion to the brand,
comparable to religious fervor.119 They feel attached to the brand and
share its values so intensely that they are likely to remain loyal even in
cases of poor product performance, scandal, bad publicity, and high
prices.120
Anthropological research provides additional insights to consumer
behavior that explain why unconditional brand loyalty and the purchase of
brand merchandise can be interconnected. Social psychologists have
114

See, e.g., KUNDE, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that in 1994, Harley Davidson earned $256.5
million from merchandising license agreements).
115
Id. at 93–94 (“[T]here is far more money to be made in merchandising sales [of the Hard Rock
Café] than in restaurant services.”).
116
DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND
NAME 39–41 (1991).
117
Id. at 41.
118
Pimentel & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1; see also Kozinets, supra note 64, at 75–76 (noting
that in a meeting of the Star Trek brand community, the members discussed whether they should be
required to wear Star Trek uniforms to the community’s social functions).
119
See Pimentel & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1 (referring to brands that may take on aspects of
the “sacred”).
120
Id.
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shown that “behavior can impact attitudes, opinions, and beliefs.”121 This
can happen partly because we learn about ourselves by observing our own
behavior (self-perception process). It also can happen partly because, in
trying to avoid psychological discomfort arising from behavior inconsistent
with our attitudes, we are likely to change these attitudes (through the
process of “cognitive dissonance”).122 In this way, rituals maintain and
even create religious beliefs: since ritual performance is associated with
these beliefs, self-perception or cognitive dissonance processes will cause
non-believers to start believing and will strengthen the devotion of
believers. Research has shown that commitment to a religious group
typically increases after some anticipated event, like prophecy, fails to
occur. To reconcile their behavior—performing religious rituals—with the
new, seemingly contradictory, information, adherents claim greater belief
and pursue the rituals with new passion.123
Brand merchandise functions much in the same way as that of a
religious ritual in its reinforcement of core beliefs. The act of buying and
displaying brand merchandise strengthens brand loyalty, making it more
difficult for the consumer to challenge his or her attitude in the future.
Consumers are thus likely to remain loyal even when the brand could
otherwise have disappointed them.
F. An Intermediate Conclusion
This first Part has demonstrated that to a certain extent, marketing
experts have succeeded in disseminating brand fetishism. Conspicuously
displayed brands reveal that a brand sometimes triumphs over its productcarrier. Brand extensions into dissimilar product categories further show
that today’s leading brands are often perceived in terms of abstract images
rather than in terms of product-related expertise. Consumers easily accept
the ability of these brands to be detached from their primary product field
and function as entities in their own right. Brand merchandising reveals
that some brands serve as objects of religious-like devotion. At the same
time, all of these phenomena are vital in maintaining and reinforcing brand
fetishism.
III. TRADEMARK LAW AND BRAND FETISHISM
A. Setting the Scene
Trademark law is built upon premises radically inconsistent with brand
121
Richard Sosis, Why Aren’t We All Hutterites? Costly Signaling Theory and Religious
Behavior, 14 HUM. NATURE 91, 97 (2003).
122
Id. at 97–98.
123
Id.
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fetishism. In the legal world, trademarks are informational devices.124
They serve as efficient means of communicating information about the
source and quality of goods in an increasingly complex modern market.125
The central economic justification for trademark protection is the “search
costs” rationale—trademarks reduce consumer search costs, thus
promoting overall economic efficiency.126 At the same time, trademarks
allow their owners to benefit from the reputation of their goods, thus
encouraging investment in the quality of these goods.127
Underlying trademark law is the assumption that a trademark has no
value in itself. Its only significance lies in the goodwill it represents, i.e., a
reputation for product quality.128 Consequently, one of the basic principles
of trademark law is that a trademark is not a taboo—not every reproduction
of a trademark is forbidden. A trademark is infringed only if the
unauthorized use is likely to confuse the consumer.129 Viewed in this light,
trademark protection does not require firm justification. In contrast to
other intellectual property rights which impose high costs on society by
temporarily hampering competition, such as patent rights or copyrights,
trademark law contributes to market efficiency and imposes relatively few
124

See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 770–71 (1992) (“[T]he legal
recognition of an inherently distinctive trademark or trade dress acknowledges the owner’s legitimate
proprietary interest in its unique and valuable informational device . . . .”); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) (“[A]
trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need not investigate the
attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me
that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”).
125
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995) (defining a trademark
as a “word, name, symbol, device, or other designation . . . used in a manner that identifies . . . goods or
services and distinguishes them from the goods or services of others”); Benjamin G. Paster,
Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551–52 (1969) (arguing that in the
increasingly complex commercial reality, trademarks became necessary tools used to identify the
producers of the various products).
126
See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose
of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of
the particular source of particular goods.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 2:5 (“The point is that
trademarks reduce the customer’s cost of acquiring information about products and services.”); Landes
& Posner, supra note 124, at 270 (“The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible
by the information or reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand . . . .”).
127
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“[T]rademark] law helps
assure a producer that it . . . will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product. The law thereby ‘encourage[s] the production of quality products’ . . . .” (alteration
in original)); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168, 179 (2003) (“[A] firm with a valuable trademark will be reluctant
to lower the quality of its brand . . . . [The] legal protection of trademarks encourages the production of
higher-quality products.”).
128
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 806 (D. Del. 1920) (explaining that the
“trade-mark is the expression . . . of part or all of the good will of the business . . . . Separate from the
good will of the business it identifies, [the trademark] is useless, valueless”); MCCARTHY, supra note
31, § 2:15.
129
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (“When the mark is used in a way that
does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the
truth. It is not taboo.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:11.
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costs.130
Trademark law is based on the premise that a trademark is merely a
name or signifier, whereas the substance is the product associated with the
mark. Brand fetishism, however, assumes the opposite: consumers should
be trained to perceive trademarks as entities with independent value.131
Whereas trademark law is premised on competition for the quality and
prices of goods, modern marketing literature advises corporations to avoid
Whereas trademark law encourages
this kind of competition.132
corporations to invest in product quality, marketing experts instead advise
corporations to focus on creating strong brands.133 This dichotomy raises a
critical question: how should trademark law react to this new commercial
reality?
The trend toward brand fetishism began in the 1920s, when
corporations started shifting their resources from production of goods to
establishing strong brands through marketing. In 1927, Frank Schechter
published one of the most famous and influential articles on trademark law,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, which argued that trademarks
can no longer be regarded merely as the visible manifestation of the
business goodwill.134 Schechter advocated that the value of a trademark
lies not only in the quality of goods it represents, but also in its selling
power and its psychological hold upon the public.135 He concluded that the
preservation of this value should constitute the only rational basis for
trademark protection.136
Schechter’s article was written when enthusiasm for psychological
advertising and other brand strategies was high.137 The article implicitly
assumed that trademark law should reflect commercial reality: components
that comprise the value of a trademark should be protected. As trademarks
move away from their primary function and become objects of fetish,

130
Nicola Bottero et al., The Extended Protection of “Strong” Trademarks, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 265, 267 (2007) (“[W]hile other intellectual property rights . . . provide a mix of static
costs and dynamic benefits . . . very few costs and no deadweight losses whatsoever are associated with
trademark protection.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1227 (2007) (“Trademark law . . . represents
an affirmation of, rather than a departure from, the competitive model that drives the United States
economy. It is in this respect distinct from the rest of intellectual property (IP) law, which departs from
the competitive norm in order to encourage investment in invention and creation.”).
131
See supra Part II.B.
132
See supra Part II.B.
133
See supra Part II.B.
134
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 818
(1927).
135
Id. at 831.
136
Id.
137
Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 INTELL. PROP.
L. BULL. 187, 192 (2007).
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138

scholars increasingly doubt this assumption.
Nevertheless, Schechter’s
view remains quite popular to this day; many scholars believe that as long
as trademark owners invest vast resources in creating valuable brand
personalities, their investment should be protected.139
This approach, however, is circular, as brand personality would have
no economic value were it not legally protected.140 If everyone could make
unauthorized use of the spiritual dimension of another’s trademark,
trademark owners could not internalize their investment in these
dimensions. Consequently, they would not have sufficient economic
incentives to build up brands with personalities and souls. The fact that
corporations expend energy in creating spiritual dimensions to their
trademarks should lead us to assume that these dimensions most probably
enjoy legal protection.
In the 1930s, the “anonymous source theory” and the “quality theory”
of trademark law detached the trademark from the physical origin of
goods, thereby advancing “commodity fetishism” to new heights.141 Much
in the same way, we must expect that given the modern reality of brand
fetishism, this practice must enjoy legal support. Part IV below will
expose the mechanisms in modern trademark law that result in the
protection of spiritual dimensions of brands—and support brand fetishism.
But first, the next section will examine whether trademark law may have
good reasons to discourage brand fetishism.

138
See, e.g., id. (“The normative question, however, is why the law should protect a mark’s grip
on consumers when that grip is due to factors other than information about the quality of the
product . . . .”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 484–85 (2005) (asserting that trademarks should not be protected
against unauthorized use on merchandising, as “[t]he investment at issue in these cases is not
investment in the quality of the underlying product . . . but investment in merchandising the brand
itself”).
139
See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:121 (noting that on the question of how to quantify
dilution damages, “a marketing or advertising expert could testify that in her opinion, the famous mark
will in fact lose some of its selling power”); Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in
Federal Dilution Legislation Part II, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 31–32 (2000)
(suggesting that trademarks should be granted protection akin to the right of publicity); Magid et al.,
supra note 13, at 32 (“Decreased brand image should be the focus of determining whether, and the
extent to which, a trademark risks dilution.”); Ellen P. Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and
Protection for a Trademark’s “Persona,” 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 196–97 (1981) (suggesting that
trademarks should be granted protection akin to the right of publicity).
140
See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 815 (1935) (“The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales device
depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham
Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1709 (1999) (“[I]t does not follow that
because something is valuable it must be owned.”); see also Assaf, supra note 8, at 75 (“It cannot be
argued that the property right of the trademark owner is the right to protect the economic value of the
trademark, since its value is the outcome of the legal protection.”).
141
See supra Part II.A.
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B. Why Should Brand Fetishism Be Discouraged?
The most compelling argument in favor of protecting brand
personalities was articulated by Jay Dratler:
The free-market philosophy that undergirds all economic
law in the United States is based upon consumers’
sovereignty and free choice.
Under the famous
“nondiscrimination” principle . . . consumers’ free choice in
the marketplace, not the predilections of any elite . . .
determines the value of products and services for purposes of
economic law, including trade symbol law. Widespread use
of trade symbols as general “brand” identifiers, rather than as
markers of particular products or services . . . appears to have
been beneficial . . . to consumers . . . .142
Put differently, although trademark law was initially intended to
protect consumer choices based on quality and price, if today’s consumer
prefers to buy brand personalities rather than products, this is what the
market should deliver.
This approach reveals a major tension characterizing the current
discourse on trademarks: the relationship between commercial reality and
legal doctrines. It is a truism that the legal system should react to
commercial reality. The question, however, is how it should react.
Traditional economic analysis of trademark law perceives the consumer as
a rational being seeking to satisfy his or her preferences and using
trademarks as means of reducing her search costs.143 At the same time,
marketing experts actively and systematically undermine the consumer’s
mechanisms of rational thought. They openly admit that marketing is
aimed at creating emotional attachments, which ultimately triumph over
rational analysis.144 Eventually, marketing efforts succeed, and turn some
brands into tools of psychological influence, so that the brand stimulates
the consumer emotionally to buy the product. Then the legal conclusion is
that consumers, purchasing branded products without any apparent
functional reason, demonstrate that they are interested in brand
personalities rather than in products. If so, brand personality is what
trademark law should protect. Choosing this approach, trademark law
ignores the commercial reality, rather than adjusting itself to it.
The fact that consumer demand exists for brands with strong spiritual
dimensions should not necessarily lead one to conclude that consumers are
interested in these dimensions. An emotionally attached consumer may be
more loyal to a brand than a satisfied consumer, but that certainly does not
142

JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 11.03 (2008).
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
144
See supra Part II.C.
143
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mean that consumers wish to become emotionally attached to brands.
Marketing experts simply wield certain features of human perception
against the consumer.
Empirical evidence shows that some consumers do not purchase brand
personalities consciously. Consumers often base their brand loyalty on a
perceived high product quality,145 and sometimes refuse to admit that they
are “in love” with a brand, although indirect evidence shows that this is
precisely the case.146 Emotional attachment to the brand positively
influences the consumer’s evaluation of product quality.147 For example,
in the mid-1990s, Budweiser introduced its “Lizards” ad campaign, which
significantly improved the image of the brand. Although the products were
not modified, consumers reported that the beer tasted better.148 On an
interpersonal level, feelings of love encourage a biased, positive perception
of the relationship partner, rendering comparisons with alternatives
difficult. The same is true when the partner is a brand.149 For example,
Coca-Cola consistently fails in blind taste-tests when pitted against other
soda brands, and yet its loyal customers persist in their belief that CocaCola tastes the best.150 Similarly, experiments demonstrate that people rate
the taste of beer and cigarettes much lower when they do not realize that
they are exposed to their favorite brand.151
Since emotional attachments to brands produce misperceptions of
product quality, it cannot be said that all consumers, who are loyal to a
certain brand in spite of lack of substantial quality advantages, consciously
purchase the spiritual dimensions of these brands. Many consumers are
not interested in a love affair with a brand. As Benjamin R. Barber notes,
[m]arketing . . . hijacks authentic emotions and sentiments
145
Fournier, supra note 62, at 365 (“At the core, all strong brand relationships were rooted in
beliefs about superior product performance. Beliefs in the utilitarian functioning of the brand were
sometimes bolstered by performance myths . . . that marked the brand as superior and irreplaceable and
thus resistant to competitive attack.”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 3:4 (discussing brain scan
studies with Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, in which brand loyalty was found to override the original taste
preferences of loyal consumers); Swann, supra note 8, at 948 (“When queried about why they buy
brands such as Coca-Cola . . . or Mercedes-Benz, consumer responses typically reflect little insight into
the appeal of brands. ‘Coca-Cola tastes better than Pepsi,’ some will argue. . . . ‘Mercedes-Benz is an
incredibly well-engineered car; it will last forever.’ These reasons may or may not be true, but few
consumers can reliably distinguish between brands of soft drinks, and most consumers in the United
States keep their cars for only a few short years.”).
146
Albert et al., supra note 62, at 1074 (“[T]he word ‘love’ is explicitly employed in the U.S.
(declaration of love) whereas French consumers rather use ‘adore’ or ‘like’ when talking about the
loved brand.”).
147
Fournier, supra note 62, at 365 (“The intimacy [in consumer-brand relations] supports stability
through biased perceptions of the partner . . . .”); Swann, supra note 8, at 948.
148
HOLT, supra note 53, at 10.
149
Fournier, supra note 62, at 364.
150
See supra note 2; Swann, supra note 8, at 948.
151
OTTO BLUME ET AL., WERBUNG FÜR MARKENARTIKEL 39–40 (1976) (available only in
German); Katya Zakharov, The Scope of Protection of Trademark Image, 36 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP.
& COMPETITION L. 787, 788 (2005).
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and employs them in wholly instrumental ways to sell
products in which neither producers nor consumers otherwise
are likely to have much interest and for which in any case
there is little inherent demand. . . . Although the marketers
. . . are trying to invoke emotions in consumers, they
themselves are acting rationally, employing a powerful form
of instrumental reason—emotion rationally deployed in the
name of profits. The love affair with a brand is the
responsibility of the marketing agents and not of the
consumer.152
The consumer is not perfectly rational. Although no experiments have
yet been conducted, I would venture to guess that a great number of
consumers would reconsider their brand loyalty if presented with evidence
that it does not adequately reflect their taste preferences. Brands often
cause consumers to “judge the book by its cover,” a behavior many of
them would probably regard as irrational. Brands evoking strong emotions
hinder sober quality judgments and rational purchasing decisions. This, in
turn, distorts market competition. The market currently provides greater
incentives to invest in brand personalities than in products, although this
does not necessarily reflect consumers’ preferences. Many consumers
would rather have brands play the role of the name, not the rose—that is,
would rather have brands indicate products rather than be the product
itself.
Brand fetishism is the market condition under which corporations
strive to charge premium prices without offering superior products. It has
led the market to an absurd situation, in which competition on product
quality and prices—the type of competition that serves the most basic
consumer interests—is considered the “worst case scenario.”153 These are
good reasons for discouraging brand fetishism. Trademark law should
strive to restore “commodity” competition so that it again becomes
commonplace. The promotion of this kind of competition is the
traditional—and, I believe, the only—rational basis of trademark law.
All this notwithstanding, it is still hardly deniable that a significant
number of consumers are quite conscious of the spiritual dimension of
brands. Some consumers purchase luxury brands as status symbols.
Others engage in brand cults and rituals, thereby explicitly recognizing
brands as spiritual beings. It can be argued that although traditional
economic rationales do not justify the protection of the spiritual
dimensions of brands, these dimensions do fulfill important needs for some
consumers and this should provide an alternative basis for their protection.
152
153

BARBER, supra note 38, at 182–84, 196–97.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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This argument will be addressed (and rebutted) below, in Part V. But first,
Part IV will survey the various mechanisms within trademark law that
support and encourage brand fetishism. Throughout Part IV, it will be
assumed that trademark law—if it wishes to remain true to its basic
rationales—should discourage brand fetishism.
IV. HOW DOES TRADEMARK LAW SUPPORT BRAND FETISHISM?
The discussion below is divided into three sections, each one analyzing
legal rules relevant to a specific (potential) market of a trademark: Part A
discusses the primary market of a trademark; Part B analyzes collateral
markets; and Part C focuses on merchandising markets.
A. The Primary Market
A trademark’s “primary market” refers to goods that belong to the
trademark owner’s primary field of activity, and closely related goods.
1. The Quality Control Requirement
Licensing a trademark for use in its primary market is known as
Typically, a company that previously
“classical licensing.”154
manufactured a particular product and established goodwill in its
trademark, “outsources” the task of manufacturing to a licensee, who can
perform this task more economically.155 On the one hand, licensing
detaches the trademark from its source, thus necessarily impairing its
informative function to a certain extent.156 On the other hand, the
economic benefits of such licensing are obvious, given the advantages of
economies of scale, as well as the cheaper human and natural resources
available in foreign countries.157 To ensure that a licensed trademark
continues to indicate a consistent quality of goods, the Lanham Act
requires the licensor to exercise quality control over the licensee.158
Licensing without quality control constitutes a so-called “naked license,”
and results in the loss of trademark rights.159
Judicial practice ascribes great importance to the requirement of
quality control. A trademark carries with it a message that its owner
154
David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the Third
Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 714 (1999) [hereinafter Franklyn, Apparent
Manufacturer].
155
David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for Trademark
Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) [hereinafter Franklyn, Licensors].
156
Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 19, 25
(1995).
157
Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 341, 348–49 (2007).
158
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:40; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (2006).
159
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:48.
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controls the quality of goods sold under the mark’s auspices. Without such
oversight, the goods sold under the mark are not “genuine.”160 Hence, an
uncontrolled license is “inherently deceptive.”161 Quality control, it is
commonly said, imposes an affirmative duty upon the trademark owner.162
This rhetoric notwithstanding, the quality control requirement has
never constituted a serious burden for trademark owners. Throughout the
history of the Lanham Act, courts have been extremely reluctant to accept
naked license claims.163 Judges repeatedly hold that claims of naked
license face a stringent burden of proof.164 They eagerly seek evidence of
quality control, and seem to be willing to accept any sign of such
control.165 For instance, several courts held that even a minimal control
over the licensee can satisfy the requirement of the Lanham Act;166 others
found that reliance on the licensee’s own quality control measures,167 or
even reliance on the licensee’s general reputation suffices.168 In a number
of decisions, even mere contractual provisions allowing quality control,
without any evidence of actual control, were held to fulfill the quality
control requirement.169 Almost every case dealing with an argument of
naked license reiterates the strict rhetoric of the quality control
160

Id.
Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2002);
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:48.
162
Franchised Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664, 669 (2d Cir. 1968); Dawn Donut Co.
v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959); Huntington Nat’l Mattress Co. v.
Celanese Corp. of Am., 201 F. Supp. 938, 945 (D. Md. 1962).
163
Calboli, supra note 157, at 365–67 (describing the gradual erosion of the quality control
requirement); Rudolph J. Kuss, Comment, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How Courts
Interpret the Lanham Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why This Requirement
Conflicts With Modern Licensing Realities & the Goals of Trademark Law, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 361, 371–75 (2005) (arguing that the quality control requirement has always been illusory);
Comment, Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Control, 17 DUKE L.J. 875, 898 (1968)
(“Judicial reluctance to consider the question of substantial actual control is a distinctive feature of
cases decided since the Lanham Act.”).
164
See, e.g., Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 824 (3d Cir. 2006); Creative
Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932
F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991); Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir.
1963).
165
Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570, 577–79
(1992); Calboli, supra note 157, at 366–67, 370–71.
166
Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977);
Hurricane Fence Co. v. A-1 Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 975, 989 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
167
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir.
1999); Arner v. Sharper Image Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1282, 1286 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Printers
Servs. Co. v. Bondurant, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 1631 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Land O’Lakes
Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F. Supp. 576, 581 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
168
Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 335, 341 (T.T.A.B.
1980).
169
Pike v. Ruby Foo’s Den, Inc., 232 F.2d 683, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Arthur Murray, Inc. v.
Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678, 679–80 (D. Mass. 1953); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Cameo Exclusive Prods., Inc.,
170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 596, 599 (T.T.A.B. 1971); Wolfies Rest., Inc. v. Lincoln Rest. Corp., 143
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 310, 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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requirement, and yet, infrequently is a naked license found as a matter of
fact.171
This legal situation has come under heavy fire. The few cases finding
naked licensing are said to be inconsistent with the general line of court
rulings, thus creating an unhealthy state of legal uncertainty.172 The
majority of scholars advocate abandoning the quality control requirement
altogether.173 They argue that the requirement has already become
somewhat illusory; its abandonment will simply bring the language of law
in line with judicial practice, and will provide greater clarity to trademark
owners.174 Few scholars hold the opposite view, that the quality control
requirement should be enforced more vigorously.175
Indeed, the quality control requirement in the Lanham Act does not
seem to function properly. The flaw lies, in part, in the inadequate
mechanism by which the requirement is enforced. No entity has the
authority to inspect the quality control measures exercised by a trademark
owner.176 The issue can only be examined within the context of a
trademark dispute. One court has even stated explicitly that it had no
jurisdiction over the naked license claim without such a dispute.177
Most frequently a naked license argument is raised in infringement
suits. The alleged infringer argues that she should be exempted from
liability, since the trademark owner licensed his mark without proper
quality control, thereby losing his rights to the mark.178 Naturally, courts
170
See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959); Land
O’Lakes Creameries, Inc., 221 F. Supp. at 581; Huntington Nat’l Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp. of
Am., 201 F. Supp. 938, 945 (D. Md. 1962).
171
DRATLER, supra note 142, § 11.03 (“Courts have actually decreed forfeitures . . . on grounds
of naked licensing in only a handful of cases.”).
172
Calboli, supra note 157, at 345, 394; Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 17–18; Noel
Gillespie, Licensing and the “Related Companies” Doctrine, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 209, 210
(2001); Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the “Quality Control
Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 557 (1992).
173
DRATLER, supra note 142, § 11.03; Calboli, supra note 157, at 396–400; Gillespie, supra note
172, at 210–12; W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come,
89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 365 (1985); Parks, supra note 172, at 557; Kuss, supra note 163, at 381–82.
174
Calboli, supra note 157, at 397–98; Keating, supra note 173, at 378; Parks, supra note 172, at
558; Kuss, supra note 163, at 371.
175
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:61 (“The courts should vigorously insist that a licensor
actually control the quality of goods and services sold by licensees under the licensed mark. If this is
not done, then the requirement of control becomes a mere sham . . . .”); Bannon, supra note 165, at
579–80 (“If consumers are entitled to rely upon a trademark as a symbol of equal quality, the licensor
must be required to keep constant watch on its licensees.” (citations omitted)); Johnston, supra note
156, at 29, 35–36 (“Abolishing the requirement [of quality control] is tantamount to granting the
licensor trademark rights in gross . . . . Trademarks would lose their utility as information
devices . . . .”).
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Calboli, supra note 157, at 393–94.
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Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1992).
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See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1997); Ky.
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977); Dawn Donut
Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959).
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are unwilling to allow such “culpable infringers” to escape liability and
thus show great reluctance in accepting naked license claims.179
Occasionally, a naked license claim is raised in a genuine dispute over
priority rights in a trademark. In such cases, courts do consider the claim
seriously and carefully examine the quality control efforts of the party in
question. In fact, findings of a naked license are very common in such
cases.180 And almost all the cases in which a naked license was found did
not involve “culpable infringers.”181
Viewed in this light, judicial practice may still seem inconsistent, but
can hardly be accused of being unpredictable. Put simply, the fate of a
naked license claim depends on the identity of the party raising this claim.
Thus, the primary reason why the quality control requirement suffers from
lack of enforcement lies in the judicial hostility towards the parties who
typically raise the naked license argument.
It is the licensee, of course, who would naturally be most likely to
prove that a trademark license is naked—she knows better than anyone
how much control the licensor actually exercises. Yet, judicial practice has
developed the doctrine of “licensee estoppel,” according to which a
trademark licensee is estopped from challenging the validity of the licensed
trademark on grounds of insufficient quality control.182 Even when the
evidence clearly indicates a lack of quality control, the court will reject a
naked license claim raised by a licensee.183 Underlying the “licensee
estoppels” are equitable considerations:
[A] licensee claiming that its own license is a naked license
essentially seeks to benefit from its own misfeasance. . . .
[B]y relying on its own ability to offer inferior or nonuniform
goods and services under the trademark or trade name, the
licensee seeks to free itself of the constraints imposed by the
licensor’s ownership of the trademark or trade name.184
179

DRATLER, supra note 142, § 11.03; Parks, supra note 172, at 541.
See generally Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2002)
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accepted.
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Licensee estoppel is perhaps the prime factor accounting for poor
enforcement of the quality control requirement in trademark law. The
doctrine essentially treats trademarks as purely private rights rather than as
public informational devices. It prefers the dubious concerns with fairness
in the licensor-licensee relations over the public interest in the accuracy of
information embedded in trademarks.185
If a trademark licensee is not controlled, then the licensee, and not the
formal trademark owner, is the true “source” of the trademarked products.
Transferring the trademark to the licensee under such circumstances would
bring the legal rights in accordance with the commercial reality.186 If the
public interest that the goods sold under a trademark be “genuine” is to be
taken seriously, this interest should prevail over equitable considerations
between private parties. Trademarks should serve as informational
devices, rather than as pure objects of private property. The reality behind
trademarks should be shaped according to consumer expectations and not
according to contractual rights. Therefore, a licensee should be able to
claim that she has acquired rights in a trademark because of an
uncontrolled license.
This being said, it should be acknowledged that a legal quality control
requirement, however strict and efficiently enforced, can hardly guarantee
that trademark owners will actually invest resources in ensuring the quality
of their goods. Many scholars have pointed out the absurdity of requiring
licensing trademark owners to inspect the quality of the manufactured
goods, while not imposing any similar requirement on trademark owners
who manufacture through their own subsidiaries.187 Since trademark
owners who manufacture through their own subsidiaries are not legally
obligated to control the quality of goods, the quality control requirement
cannot guarantee that all trademarked goods will be of the same quality.188
Thus, a trademark licensor could simply purchase the manufacturing
licensee company in order to avoid the need to exercise quality control.
In the oft-cited Kentucky Fried Chicken decision, upholding a very
questionable quality control program, the Fifth Circuit stated: “[W]e do not
185
By contrast, in the context of antitrust law, courts give much more weight to public interest
and readily recognize anticompetitive contractual provisions as void. See, e.g., Am. Standard, Inc. v.
Meehan, 517 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“Federal courts will not enforce a contract that
violates the Sherman Act . . . .”).
186
Of course, if there were many licensees operating in the same geographical area, this solution
would be impossible. The proper solution in this case would be to render the mark generic.
187
See Calboli, supra note 157, at 390–91 (discussing the differential treatment accorded to
licensor trademark owners and non-licensor trademark owners); Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at
15–16 (“[I]t may be meaningless to require a licensee to produce goods that are of the ‘same quality’ as
the licensor’s own goods, since the licensor’s own goods may not be of a consistent quality.”); Keating,
supra note 173, at 365 (stating that the “trademark owner is under no duty to impose standards of
quality control on products of his own manufacture”); Parks, supra note 172, at 562–63.
188
Calboli, supra note 157, at 390–91; Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 15–16; Keating,
supra note 173, at 365; Parks, supra note 172, at 562–63.
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sit to assess the quality of products sold on the open market. . . . [T]he
consuming public must be the judge of whether the quality control efforts
have been ineffectual.”189 Several legal scholars join this line of reasoning,
asserting that market forces—and not legal doctrines—should direct the
practices of trademark licensing.190 Indeed, trademark law was initially
intended to encourage investments in product quality, and not to enforce
quality control standards. If trademark owners supervise the quality of the
goods bearing their marks solely because of their legal obligations,
trademark law does not function as it should. And the trouble does not lie
simply in the loose judicial interpretation of the quality control
requirement. More troubling is that trademark owners, even when their
marks are as famous as KFC’s, may in fact be interested in licensing their
marks without proper quality control. This means that trademark owners
do not have sufficient incentives to invest in the quality of their goods.
Trademark law cannot alter this commercial reality by requiring
trademark owners to make investments in which they are uninterested.
Effective enforcement of the quality control requirement may produce
some change, but it will hardly alter the basic fact that it may be more
profitable to invest in creating emotional influence than to offer high
quality products. If we are concerned with the current tendency toward
brand fetishism, the solution should be sought elsewhere. The legal system
should strive to encourage investment in the quality of goods, while
simultaneously discouraging, as much as possible, the investment in brand
personalities. These possibilities will be discussed presently.
2. Contractual Liability
It is well-known that although a trademark should identify a consistent
level of quality, and “the consumer is entitled to assume an equal level of
quality of goods and services sold through many franchised outlets using a
single mark,”191 this assumption does not create a legally enforceable
bargain.192 For example, in Szajna v. General Motors Corp., the plaintiff
brought an action on behalf of himself and others who purchased 1976
Pontiac Ventura automobiles which, unbeknownst to them, had been
equipped with inferior transmissions designed for an entirely different
vehicle.193 Recognizing the quality assurance function of trademarks, the
189

Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).
E.g., Gillespie, supra note 172, at 209; Landes & Posner, supra note 124, at 270 (“It should be
apparent that the benefits of trademarks in lowering consumer search costs presuppose legal protection
of trademarks.”); Kuss, supra note 163, at 378 (discussing how consumers “are in a better position to
police franchisees than the franchisor”).
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MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 3:11.
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Id. § 3:10; Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Revisiting “The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection:” Control of Quality and Dilution—Estranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 65, 77
(1990).
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court nevertheless dismissed the claim, stating that “the name ‘1976
Pontiac Ventura,’ alone does not create an express warranty of the kind or
nature of the car’s components.”194
This position views trademarks as self-enforcing tools of
competition—the basic assumption is that the trademark owner’s interest
in creating and preserving the value of his mark will guarantee consistent
product quality.195 In a world where market forces drive competition in
alternative directions, however, this assumption may no longer hold water.
The most direct way to restore the quality assurance function of trademarks
under these new circumstances is to recognize the trademark’s message of
an equal product quality as a legally enforceable contractual claim.
As the court noted in Szajna v. General Motors, consumers are not
unfamiliar with the phenomenon of varying quality of trademarked
products.196 Yet, this fact should not lead us to conclude that the
consumer’s assumption of equal product quality should not be a reasonable
contractual expectation today. Consumer behavior may be driven by
various motives, “some rational, some emotional, some conscious, and
some unconscious.”197 In addition, different consumers are motivated by
different reasons. The legal system is thus confronted with a normative
choice: which consumer motives should be recognized as legally
significant, and which consumer groups should be awarded legal
protection?
If a consumer who has a “functional relationship” with a mark
purchases a trademarked product at a premium price, aware that the quality
of the product might differ from the quality of other trademarked products,
she may be behaving irrationally. She may be giving this consideration too
little credence, or she may be emotionally influenced by the mark, or both.
At the same time she may, consciously or not, anticipate that the quality
will be the same, or at least similar. If we take this latter expectation as
decisive, then we essentially choose to restore the quality function of the
trademark. But if we suppose that uneven product quality is to be expected
today, we veer close to asserting that it is no longer rational for consumers
having a “functional relationship” with a trademark to continue purchasing
trademarked products. In this case, the economic justification for
trademark protection loses much of its appeal.
3. Tort Liability
Our toolbox for increasing quality concerns among trademark owners
194

Id. at 771.
Id.; Bannon, supra note 192, at 77.
Szanja, 503 N.E.2d at 771.
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includes, so far, the quality control requirement and contractual liability.198
To these two, we should add a third: tort liability. Throughout the history
of trademark law, numerous decisions have pondered the question of
whether a trademark owner should be liable in case of an injury caused by
a defective product bearing his mark.199
According to Section 400 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, several
decisions established tort liability of trademark owners based solely on the
fact that their mark appeared on the defective products.200 Some of these
decisions explicitly based the liability on the consumer’s right to rely upon
the quality assurance function of the mark.201 For example, in Brandimarti
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., the court stated that the consumer who
purchases a Caterpillar tractor relies on the skill and the reputation
associated with the Caterpillar trademark; in the eyes of the purchaser, the
trademark assures product quality.202 Therefore, in the case of a defective
product, Caterpillar Tractor Co. should be liable.203 Several other
decisions held that the profits reaped from trademark licensing constitute a
policy rationale for imposing tort liability on the trademark owner.204
Yet, this line of cases reflected a minority view. Mainstream judicial
decisions under the Restatement (Second) of Torts developed, instead, two
doctrines to determine trademark licensor’s tort liability: the “apparent
manufacturer” doctrine205 and the “stream of commerce” doctrine.206
Although somewhat differing in their justifications, both doctrines lead to
the same practical outcome: they both base licensor’s tort liability on his
involvement in the manufacturing process. Consequently, a large body of
case law consistently holds that only trademark licensors who are actively
involved in the manufacturing process and exercise significant quality
control should bear tort liability for defective products.207 In contrast,
198

See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
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trademark licensors, who do not participate significantly in the
manufacturing process, are typically exempt from tort liability.208 The
Restatement (Third) of Torts subsequently adopted this judicial
approach.209
A number of cases specifically scrutinized the correlation between tort
liability and the quality control requirement of the Lanham Act. It has
been repeatedly held that the quality control requirement does not indicate
that all trademark licensors must be sufficiently involved in the
manufacturing process to be found liable for defective products.210 As one
court explained, a failure to exercise quality control may result in a loss of
trademark rights, but not in tort liability.211 Even if the trademark owner
could have prevented the damage, had he exercised quality control, the
failure to control does not lead to liability for negligence, since it is not the
primary cause of the damage.212 Moreover, the level of control needed to
satisfy the Lanham Act requirement does not result in tort liability.213
Hence, a trademark owner can exercise sufficient control in order to
preserve his trademark rights without risking such liability.214
The legal approach that links tort liability to the degree of involvement
in the manufacturing process obviously discourages trademark licensors
from engaging in extensive quality control programs. Indeed, in order to
avoid tort liability, trademark owners are advised to retain only the
absolute minimum control necessary to maintain their rights.215 For
208
See, e.g., Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1984); Kealoha v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 844 F. Supp. 590, 597 (D. Haw. 1994); Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck,
Inc., 579 A.2d 26, 35 (Conn. 1990); Hebel, 442 N.E. at 205; Poulos v. Cock ’N Bull Beverage, Inc.,
487 P.2d 1350, 1352 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods. of Tex., 623 S.W.2d 797,
806 (Tex. App. 1981).
209
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manufactured by another.’ Thus, the manufacturer may be liable under §§ 1–4, but the licensor, who
does not sell or otherwise distribute products, is not liable under this Section of this Restatement.
Trademark licensors are liable for harm caused by defective products distributed under the licensor’s
trademark or logo when they participate substantially in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the
licensee’s products. In these circumstances they are treated as sellers of the products bearing their
trademarks.”).
210
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instance, some suggest that licensing agreements state that the licensor has
no right to interfere with the actual production.216 This situation clearly
indicates that trademark law has gone down the wrong path.
Concerned with this situation, legal scholars offer various—and
contradictory—solutions. On one end of the spectrum, David J. Franklyn
argues for reducing the tort liability of trademark licensors.217 Decisions
imposing liability on trademark licensors who exercise quality control
punish licensors who are involved in the manufacturing process instead of
encouraging them.218 Franklyn suggests creating a presumption of nonliability to counter this problem.219 In contrast, Jennifer Rudis Deschamp
argues that strengthening tort liability would induce trademark owners to
engage in quality control programs.220 Deschamp proposes creating a
presumption of liability.221
Both Franklyn and Deschamp, however, agree on at least one policy,222
adopted by both judicial practice and the Restatement (Third) of Torts. By
the way of exception, tort liability is imposed on trademark licensors
regardless of their involvement in the manufacturing process, when the
identity of the real manufacturer is not sufficiently disclosed,223 or when
the trademark licensor induces the consumer to believe that he approved
the quality of the goods bearing his mark.224
The identity of the real manufacturer is rarely concealed. Indeed,
today one is even legally required to disclose the manufacturer’s
identity.225 Thus, the main question is when we should assume that the
trademark licensor induces the consumer to believe that the licensor
controls the quality of the trademarked goods. I believe we should always
make this assumption.
If we assume that a purchaser of Tommy Hilfiger shirts and jeans
should understand that the shirts are manufactured by Oxford Industries,
Inc. and the jeans by Pepe Jeans London, while Tommy Hilfiger is not
significantly involved in the manufacture of these items, then we
essentially endorse Tommy Hilfiger’s “business of signing his name.”226 If
the consumer should investigate the identity of the real manufacturer of
216
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each trademarked item, then what role does the trademark play? Does it
provide any product information? Does it reduce consumers’ search costs?
The assumption that the consumer should expect only Oxford Industries
and Pepe Jeans to bear responsibility for defective Tommy Hilfiger shirts
and jeans amounts to a legal recognition of trademarks as mere
psychological stimuli. It is, for all intents and purposes, a legal stamp of
approval of brand fetishism.
There is a certain amount of hypocrisy in benefiting from royalties
paid by the trademark licensee, and later assuming no liability for defective
trademarked products. The royalties paid for the license indicate that both
the trademark owner and the licensee admit that the trademark induces
consumers to buy the trademarked goods. When the trademark owner later
argues that the consumers had no reason to assume that he was
significantly involved in the manufacturing process, he essentially admits
having “tricked” the consumer by the licensing agreement. In fact, he
acknowledges that the real purpose of putting the trademark on the
licensee’s products is to induce irrational consumer responses, and not to
convey meaningful product information.
I suggest that the consumer should always be entitled to presume that
the trademark owner either manufactures or substantially controls the
quality of the goods bearing his mark. Trademark law should act to restore
the informative function of trademarks. A trademark should convey more
than a brand personality. It should carry the message that the trademark
owner is a meaningful source of the goods. Without such a message, there
is no justification for granting legal protection to the trademark.
If market forces no longer provide sufficient incentives for companies
to treat consumers as rational beings, the law should intervene and restore
these incentives. Thus the trademark licensor should always be liable for
damages caused by defective products bearing his mark. Lack of quality
control should not benefit the trademark licensor by exempting him from
tort liability. On the contrary, it may be sensible to recognize that lack of
such control constitutes negligence. Such a legal approach would
encourage trademark owners to carefully inspect the goods bearing their
marks.
4. Post-Sale Confusion
We have thus far surveyed various methods to encourage trademark
owners to invest resources in the quality of their goods. An additional
method of directing trademark owners towards investing in product
quality, rather than in brand personality, is by discouraging the latter
investment. As far as the primary market of the trademark is concerned,
the phenomenon most closely associated with brand fetishism is the
growing conspicuousness of trademarks. As discussed above, some
trademarks have evolved from product identifiers into identifiers of the
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consumer herself.227
The most relevant trademark doctrine here is the doctrine of post-sale
confusion. Post-sale confusion occurs when the consumer knowingly
acquires an imitation of a trademarked product. The consumer is not
confused. When she displays the imitation, however, other people are
confused to the extent that they are likely to believe that she possesses the
genuine product. Such confusion is not the traditional subject matter of
trademark protection: trademarks are primarily designed to prevent the
confusion of the buying consumer.228 Yet, in the 1950s, courts started
regarding post-sale confusion as sufficient to raise liability for trademark
infringement.229 In 1962, the post-sale confusion doctrine was codified in
the Lanham Act.230 As it stands today, the doctrine of post-sale confusion
prevents the consumer from buying a fake Rolex,231 Reebok,232 Levi’s,233
or Ferrari,234 even if she intentionally wishes to purchase the counterfeit.235
One court even enjoined a defendant from selling customized kits designed
to turn a Volkswagen Beetle into a Rolls Royce.236
If people deliberately wish to buy knock-offs of trademarked products,
one must have a good reason to restrict the supply for this demand. Courts
explain that the wrong of post-sale confusion consists in the fact that the
seller of knock-offs makes it possible for his consumers to (falsely) acquire
the prestige associated with displaying the imitation in public.237
In the same vein, Landes and Posner argue that people advertise
themselves by wearing clothes, jewelry, or accessories that tell the world
that they are individuals of refined taste or high income. If others can buy
and wear cheap imitations, “the ‘signal’ given out by the purchasers of the
originals is blurred.”238 If the sole motive for buying knock-offs of
trademarked goods is to pass oneself off as having a higher income, then
one could regard the seller of the cheap copy as a kind of contributory
227
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infringer, who makes it easier for consumers to deceive the people with
whom they transact in the market of personal relations.239
Yet, promoting truthful communication in the market of personal
relations has never been the purpose of trademark law. Moreover, it is
highly doubtful that the legal system should intervene in interpersonal
relations and protect the accuracy of the signal communicating one’s high
income. Landes and Posner observe that in the fourteenth century, in
medieval Europe, magnificence in clothing was “considered the
prerogative of nobles,” who were “identifiable by modes of dress
forbidden to others.”240 “Sumptuary laws were repeatedly announced,
attempting to fix what kinds of clothes people might wear.”241 This
observation makes a valuable point: in modern western society, there is no
room for similar laws. In everyday personal transactions, one’s income is
nobody’s business. In this respect, people should be allowed to deceive
others to their hearts’ content.
Throughout history, the poor tried to emulate the style of the rich.242
Whenever a certain signal of wealth was effectively imitated, it lost its
wealth-signaling function.243 Between the sixteenth and eighteenth
centuries, for instance, lace was handmade and prohibitively expensive. In
the nineteenth century, however, when lace-making machines were
introduced, the price of lace dropped dramatically. After an initial, large
increase in popularity, the sales of lace dropped as well, for it lost its value
as a reliable signal of wealth.244 In the context of post-sale confusion,
courts often express concern that a plethora of imitations may lessen the
high value of the original, which is derived in part from its rarity.245
Indeed, as the history of lace suggests, widespread knock-offs of
trademarked articles will probably impair the wealth-signaling function of
these articles. To the extent that these articles are purchased for the
purpose of displaying one’s status, the demand for them will eventually
drop. At that point, trademark owners will no longer be able to charge
239

Id.
Id. at 308 n.83.
241
Id. at 308.
242
See Georg Simmel, Fashion, 10 INT’L Q. 130 (1904), reprinted in 62 AM. J. SOC. 541, 542–43,
548 (1957) (“Within the social embodiments of these contrasts, one side is generally maintained by the
psychological tendency towards imitation.”).
243
Id. at 544.
244
Amotz Zahavi, The Theory of Signal Selection and Some of Its Implications, in
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM OF BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 305–27 (Vittorio Pesce Delfino ed., 1987).
245
See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he purchaser of an original may be harmed if the widespread existence of knockoffs decreases the
original’s value by making the previously scarce commonplace . . . .”); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts &
Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The Oscar’s value lies
in its distinctive design, which stands as a well-recognized symbol of excellence in film.”); Esercizio v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244–45 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Ferrari has gained a well-earned reputation for
making uniquely designed automobiles of quality and rarity.”).
240
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prices much higher than what is justified by the quality of their goods. Put
differently, if Rolex knock-offs are available on every street-corner, Rolex
will no longer be able to charge premium prices for a status-signaling
function. The company will thus be compelled to fix its prices as dictated
by the quality of its goods.
If the practice of selling knock-offs becomes widespread, trademarks
will lose much of their fetishistic status and the demand for goods
prominently displaying trademarks will eventually drop. This in turn will
discourage corporations from designing their trademarks primarily as
identifiers of the consumer’s lifestyle. Consequently, the incentive to
invest resources in the product-identifying function of trademarks and in
product quality will be restored. Therefore, denying protection against
post-sale confusion would ultimately serve the primary purpose of
trademark law.
B. Collateral Markets
A trademark’s collateral market consists of goods which are not
closely related to the trademark owner’s primary field of activity.
1. The Scope of Protection Against Unauthorized Uses
Historically, a trademark was protected only within its primary market.
Trademark law restricted the unauthorized use of another’s mark only on
“merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those set
forth in the registration.”246 The idea that a trademark owner should have
exclusive rights in additional markets was first articulated in the 1920s, the
very moment in time when brand fetishism emerged.247
In the famous Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson decision of 1928, Judge
Learned Hand found that the use of the Yale trademark, registered for
locks and keys, when used on flashlights and batteries constituted an
infringement:
[A] merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the
use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to
justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic
seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries
his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the
owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his
own control.248
Along the same lines, Frank Schechter published his famous article,
246
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 96 (1905), repealed by Lanham Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (1946).
247
See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
248
26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
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The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, one year earlier, arguing that
trademark law should protect the selling power of trademarks.249
Schechter suggested that trademarks should be protected against
“dilution”—an unauthorized use of a famous mark on non-competing
goods, which gradually whittles away the power and the uniqueness of the
mark.250
The trademark infringement test and the dilution doctrine were
interrelated during the 1920s to 1960s.251 These doctrines complemented
one another, protecting trademark owners in collateral markets.252 When
the infringement test was interpreted narrowly, the judicial enthusiasm
toward dilution grew; conversely, as the infringement test was broadened,
courts begun showing hostility toward dilution claims.253 Today, however,
both infringement and dilution provide remarkably broad trademark
protection in collateral markets.254
Since the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, the test for trademark
infringement no longer revolves around the descriptive properties of the
goods. Rather, the sole question for a court is whether a reasonably
prudent purchaser would be likely to assume a connection between the
trademark owner and the alleged infringer.255 Over time, new kinds of
mistaken connections were added to the infringement test.256 Today, for an
infringement to occur, a consumer does not have to assume that the
defendant’s product was manufactured by the plaintiff or under his
supervision. Instead, an infringing use is any use likely to cause confusion
“as to the affiliation, connection, or association as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval.”257 Under this broad confusion test, “Hallmark,”
when used for an automobile dealership was found to infringe “Hallmark,”
as it is used for greeting cards,258 “Lloyd’s of London” aftershave was
found confusingly similar to “Lloyd’s of London” insurance services,259
and the “Classic Tiffany” trademark for automobiles was denied
249

Schechter, supra note 134, at 830–31.
See id. at 825 (“It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.”).
251
See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law,
85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 1007–08 (2001).
252
Id. at 1007.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 1014–16.
255
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:24 (“That the goods or services are noncompetitive does not
answer the question of whether the goods are so ‘related’ that a reasonable buyer is likely to think that
defendant’s goods or services are somehow connected with, or sponsored by, the plaintiff, due to
similar marks.”).
256
Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Polices and Fair Use,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 174–75 (2008) (listing doctrines that address issues about which consumers
supposedly get confused).
257
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
258
Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
259
Corp. of Lloyd’s v. Louis D’Or of Fr., Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 317 (T.T.A.B. 1979).
250
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registration in the face of the famous jewelry mark.260
At the same time, the doctrine of dilution provides a powerful
additional tool for enjoining unauthorized trademark uses in collateral
markets. Although it initially encountered academic criticism,261 judicial
hostility,262 and the antagonism of the federal legislature,263 the doctrine
has prevailed over opposition. Codified in federal law in 1996,264 and
strengthened by the 2006 amendment,265 the doctrine of dilution is today
firmly ingrained in United States trademark law.
Dilution occurs when a well-known trademark is used on goods or
services so different from the initial field of activity of the trademark
owner that consumers are not likely to be confused.266 The evil of dilution
lies in the fact that an additional associative link is affixed to the famous
mark, impairing its uniqueness.267 Given this rationale, the doctrine of
dilution can easily enjoin uses of a trademark in fields far removed from its
260

Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1841 (T.T.A.B.

1989).

261

See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1191–94 (1948) (noting that proponents of dilution theory suggest that it
should be “given equal protection with the interest against confusion”); Walter J. Derenberg, The
Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 455–56 (1956)
(discussing a First Circuit Court of Appeals case, which contended that dilution doctrine “has no
application when the question is whether the marks being used on goods of substantially the same
descriptive properties are similar enough to cause confusion”); Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on
the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 163 (2004) (describing court decisions as “a
patchwork of conflicting doctrines”); Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of
Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 125–26 (1993) (criticizing a proposed remedy for
overly narrow focus of law as lacking a proposition for how courts could prevent dilution).
262
Courts required that plaintiffs claiming dilution of their marks demonstrate a likelihood of
confusion, although the doctrine of dilution protects trademarks in absence of confusion. See, e.g.,
HMH Publ’g Co. v. Lambert, 482 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1973) (disregarding theory of likelihood of
confusion); DCA Food Indus. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(“Some amount of consumer confusion must be shown in order to proceed on a dilution claim.”); Girl
Scouts of the U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1233–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(“[E]ven where there is no confusion as to the origin of the goods, the courts have denied relief where
confusion is absent.”).
263
In 1988, Congress considered, but did not add protection against dilution to the Lanham Act.
The House of Representatives noted: “Serious questions were raised about [the anti-dilution] provisions
by persons concerned with the dissemination of First Amendment protected communications, and with
advertising their goods and services to the public.” H.R. Rep. No. 1028, 100th Cong., pt. 3, at 5
(1988).
264
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (1995)).
265
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063, 1064, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)); see also Bone, supra note 137, at 187,
198 (discussing the aspects in which the 2006 Amendment broadened the scope of protection against
dilution).
266
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989)
(“This Court has defined dilution as either the blurring of a mark’s product identification or the
tarnishment of the affirmative associations a mark has come to convey.”). This Article discusses the
first type of dilution known as “blurring.” The second type of dilution, “tarnishment,” is not discussed
here.
267
See Schechter, supra note 134, at 830–31 (concluding that the “preservation of the uniqueness
of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection”).
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initial product field. For instance, the use of the name “Tiffany” for
restaurant services,268 and for a movie theater,269 was found to dilute the
famous jewelry mark, the use of “Bacardi” on jewelry was enjoined as a
dilution of the trademark for rum,270 and the “Lexus” automobile mark was
protected against its use on personal care products.271
Several scholars argue that dilution and confusion are “states of mental
association existing on a continuum.”272 Others reject this view and insist
that confusion and dilution are two inconsistent states of mind—dilution
occurs only when the consumer understands that the junior user is not
connected to the trademark owner.273 Confusion, by contrast, occurs when
a consumer assumes that the junior user is connected to the trademark
owner. These two states of mind cannot exist simultaneously in one
consumer—either a person believes that the similarly marked goods are
connected or not.274
The judicial practice has not definitively chosen between these two
approaches. Some courts, finding confusion, go further to establish
dilution as a matter of course.275 Others state that where confusion is
found, dilution should not be considered.276 Occasionally, consumer
confusion is even said to prove dilution.277
268

Tiffany & Co. v. Bos. Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Mass. 1964).
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., 264 N.Y.S. 459, 460–61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932).
Bacardi & Co. v. Bacardi Mfg. Jewelers Co., 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
271
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Natural Health Trends Corp., No. 04-9028, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10442, at *17–18 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2005).
272
Magliocca, supra note 251, at 965–66 (“Although dilution is often described as starting where
the likelihood of confusion test leaves off, it is more accurate to say that infringement follows a fortiori
from dilution.”); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 729, 748
(2000) (“Confusion and dilution are states of mental association existing on a continuum that begins
with a mistake as to origin and ends with a gradually diminishing appreciation of the original.”).
273
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:72 (“[I]n no one person’s mind can both [confusion and
dilution] occur at the same time.”); Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88
IOWA L. REV. 731, 806 (2003) (“If trademark law is to retain its historical ability to weigh competing
interests fairly, courts must recognize that confusion and dilution involve distinct and inconsistent
states of mind.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
274
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:72.
275
See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2000); Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167–68 (11th Cir. 1982); Nike Inc. v.
Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Lexington Mgmt. Corp. v.
Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
276
See, e.g., Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Having
found infringement due to a likelihood of confusion, and there being no remedies for dilution separate
from the available remedies for infringement, we need not address the issue of dilution.”); Morningside
Grp. Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Grp., L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 1999); Berghoff Rest. Co. v.
Lewis W. Berghoff, Inc., 499 F.2d 1183, 1185 (7th Cir. 1974); Starbucks U.S. Brands L.L.C. v. Ruben,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1741, 1746 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
277
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 2008) (accepting surveys
demonstrating consumer confusion as evidence of dilution); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d
1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Even if the conflicting marks were not identical, Garcia (the junior user)
would still not prevail because Horphag presented additional evidence of dilution.”); Nabisco, Inc. v.
PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Consumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the
distinctive selling power of a trademark.”).
269
270
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This hesitation is easily explicable. In a world of increasingly frequent
and far-flung brand extensions, consumers’ perceptions change rapidly—
what does not confuse today may confuse tomorrow. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the boundaries between dilution and confusion are not clearcut.
The trend toward brand extensions broadens trademark protection in at
least two ways. First, courts frequently find that if a plaintiff is a
diversified company, using its trademark on various goods, the consumer,
seeing the mark on yet another product, is more likely to assume a
connection to the plaintiff.278 For instance, one court held that “[g]iven the
wide diversity of businesses that operate under the VIRGIN mark, . . .
consumers might mistakenly believe that defendant’s gasoline station was
connected in some fashion to [the Virgin Group].”279 In another case, the
mark Harley-Hog, as used for pork, was denied registration, because
Harley-Davidson had used its marks for a wide variety of whimsical
collateral products, including beer, wine coolers, chocolate bars, and
more.280 A consumer having knowledge of these uses would not be
surprised to see Harley-Hog pork products.
Second, judicial practice consistently maintains that if other companies
in the market use their marks in both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
fields, confusion is more likely, even if neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant is a diversified company.281 For example, one court stated that
278
See, e.g., Tropic-Aire, Inc. v. Approved Prod., Inc., 275 F.2d 728, 731 (C.C.P.A. 1960)
(concluding that “[a]t first blush it might seem that opposer’s sales under the ‘Tropie-Aire’ trademark
of such items as sewing machines, baby carriages, electric water heaters, electric blankets and sheets,
electric roasters and hot plates are rather far afield. It is our view, however, that the very diversity of
these products . . . make it all the more likely that purchasers would think that ‘those ‘Tropic-Aire’
people’ had brought out another product if they saw on the market a spray deodorizer for home use
bearing the trademark ‘Tropic-Aire.’”); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d
254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Mobil’s ubiquitous presence throughout the petroleum industry further
increases the likelihood that a consumer will confuse Pegasus Petroleum with Mobil.”); Armco, Inc. v.
Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Diversification makes it more likely
that a potential customer would associate the non-diversified company’s services with the diversified
company, even though the two companies do not actually compete.”); Philip Morris, Inc. v. K2 Corp.,
555 F.2d 815, 816 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“Other facts peculiar to this case . . . indicate that consumers
would be more likely to make an assumption of common source or sponsorship than would otherwise
be the case. Appellant is a diversified company . . . .”); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1691, 1695 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that “[s]ince plaintiff had used its mark on an ever-expanding line
of items . . . includ[ing] goods such as electronic equipment . . . consumers are likely to assume that the
‘R US’ mark used by defendant on phones, originate with or is otherwise connected with or sponsored
by plaintiff”).
279
Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Virgin Petroleum, Inc., No. 99-12826, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8100, at
*28 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000).
280
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 863 (T.T.A.B.
1986); see also Katherine E. Halmen, The Effects of the Corporate Diversification Trend on
Trademarks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 459, 501–05 (2006) (discussing the diversification
factor in trademark infringement cases).
281
See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding
that use of same mark in fields of software and email service is likely to cause confusion, because there
are companies that use their marks in both fields); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30
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consumers know that it is common for a single trademark to be used for an
entire line of apparel, including footwear. Therefore, apparel and shoes
sold under similar trademarks would confuse the public.282 Another court
articulated a similar statement concerning apparel and perfume.283 In
Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Satellite International Ltd., an
application to register the mark Sako for shoes was successfully opposed
by the holder of the mark Seiko for watches, based on the argument that
many companies, including Anne Klein, Fila and Gucci, market shoes and
watches under a single trademark.284 Empirical evidence supports this
judicial intuition: one experiment found that people are more likely to be
confused by a Cadillac notebook computer, when they have been
previously exposed to a similar brand extension by Mercedes-Benz.285
Given this reality, the broadening scope of trademark protection seems
inevitable. If corporations continue launching increasingly distant brand
extensions, consumer’s expectations would change accordingly, and a
corresponding infinite expansion of legal protection must follow.
Moreover, expanding legal protection influences consumer perception as
well. The more trademarks are protected against unauthorized use in
distant product fields, either based on confusion or on dilution, the more
the consumer becomes accustomed to the idea that virtually every use of
famous trademarks must be authorized.286 Consequently, the consumer is
likely to be confused by an unauthorized use of a famous mark on any
product.287
Indeed, the current trademark infringement test has an unlimited

F.3d 466, 480–81 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that to answer the question whether using the same mark on
peat moss and on fertilizer is likely to cause confusion, the court must consider whether other
companies sell both products); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Envtl. Chems., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (finding that use of same trademark on both a car dealership and an auto body shop was likely to
cause confusion because dealerships often have auto body shops).
282
Villager, Inc. v. Dial Shoe Co., 256 F. Supp. 694, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
283
Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imps. Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1174–75 (2d Cir. 1976).
284
Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Satellite Int’l Ltd., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1317, 1319
(T.T.A.B. 1991).
285
See Lee et al., supra note 8, at 933–34 (describing a hypothetical scenario with luxury
automobiles and laptop computers).
286
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:9 (“If consumers are conditioned to see certain trademarks
appear licensed and authorized on goods and services far removed from their origins, would they not
also be likely to think that unauthorized uses on far-flung goods and services are also authorized? . . . If
consumers think that most uses of a trademark require authorization, then in fact they will require
authorization because the owner can enjoin consumer confusion caused by unpermitted uses . . . .”); see
also RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW 173 (1999) (“The
use of a well-known mark on collateral products tends to condition the public to expect a wide variety
of seemingly unrelated products to come from the source symbolized by that mark, making it possible
to protect the mark far afield from its core product.”); Austin, supra note 256, at 175 (“We have a
typical chicken-and-egg problem here: do brands expand as a result of the efforts of marketers, or do
changes in the law encourage marketers to think of new ways of expanding brands?”).
287
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:9.
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potential for expansion.288 The only factor determining whether a
trademark is infringed is consumer perception—and consumer perception
in this field is very flexible. The concept of confusion is rather indefinite.
Courts recognize that under the current infringement test, which includes
confusion about affiliation, sponsorship, or approval, the perceived
connection may be vague.289 Holding that Dogiva dog biscuits infringe on
the famous Godiva chocolate mark, one court noted:
As long as the public believes there is some connection
between GODIVA chocolates and DOGIVA dog biscuits, it
is immaterial whether the public thinks that the producer of
GODIVA chocolates actually is making and selling
DOGIVA dog biscuits, whether DOGIVA dog biscuits are
being produced under its supervision, or whether some other
arrangement exists. Consumers are not concerned with such
details.290
This vague concept of confusion best explains why courts and
commentators conflate confusion and dilution. Indeed, what kind of
confusion occurs when a consumer comes upon Hallmark automobiles,291
or Lloyd’s of London aftershave?292 How is it different from the dilution
caused by Lexus personal care products,293 or Bacardi jewelry?294
Considering that courts usually base their findings on judicial intuition
rather than on survey evidence,295 it is no wonder that the all-encompassing
confusion test merges with the concept of dilution. Indeed, some scholars
argue that dilution has become redundant, since the broad confusion test
embraces virtually every unauthorized use of a famous trademark.296
A relatively new doctrine of subliminal confusion erases the already
blurred borderline between dilution and confusion entirely. According to
this doctrine, confusion may be found even when the consumer identifies
288
Assaf, supra note 8, at 41–42 (asserting that the current likelihood of confusion test has the
potential to indefinitely expand the scope of trademark protection).
289
Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690, 1697 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
public’s lack of knowledge as to the exact identity of th[e] source is irrelevant . . . .”); KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 286, at 131–32.
290
Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562, 567 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
291
Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
292
Corp. of Lloyd’s v. Louis D’Or of Fr., Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 314 (T.T.A.B. 1979).
293
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Natural Health Trends Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475,
1475 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
294
Bacardi & Co. v. Bacardi Mfg. Jewelers Co., 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
295
Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 867–
71 (2004) (“[S]urvey evidence influences courts’ deliberations on what potential consumers might
think around 35.2 percent of the time . . . .”).
296
Magliocca, supra note 251, at 967–68 (“[S]trong (i.e., famous) marks are already protected
from virtually all concurrent uses by infringement doctrine, and therefore dilution extends no additional
protection . . . .”); Staffin, supra note 197, at 162–64 (“Perhaps the most potent criticism of the dilution
doctrine is that it is not necessary.”).
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the manufacturer of the defendant’s product, but because of a subliminal or
subconscious association with the plaintiff, prescribes the properties and
reputation of the plaintiff’s products to those of the defendant.297
This subliminal confusion doctrine highlights the amorphous shape of
the current confusion test. Assumptions as to the connection between the
trademark owner and the alleged infringer do not even have to reach the
consumer’s consciousness. All this begs the question: to what extent does
the consumer need protection from this kind of confusion? To answer this
question, the next section will discuss what consumers actually expect and
what they are legally entitled to expect concerning trademark use in
collateral markets.
2. Quality Control and Tort Liability
As discussed above, the Lanham Act requires that a trademark license
includes a mechanism of quality control. This requirement has been
subject to rather lax judicial interpretation and many scholars suggest
abandoning it altogether.298 These scholars argue that the justification for
abandoning the quality control requirement is even more persuasive in the
field of collateral licensing than in the realm of classical licensing.299 The
primary rationale underlying the quality control requirement is to ensure
that all goods sold under a trademark are of the same quality. Arguably,
this rationale is irrelevant when a trademark is licensed in an entirely
dissimilar field.300 For instance, if the Coca-Cola mark is licensed for
teddy bears, it is meaningless to require the Coca-Cola Company to control
the quality of the teddy bears so as to ensure that it is consistent with the
quality of the soft drinks.301
In collateral licensing, the trademark owner is usually not in a position
to control the quality of the licensed products. He has never manufactured
297
See Stern’s Miracle-Gro Prods., Inc. v. Shark Prods., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1077, 1090 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (noting that “trademark laws are designed to protect this type of subtle, associational
confusion”); Farberware, Inc. v. Mr. Coffee, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 291, 302 (D. Del. 1990) (evaluating the
possibility of subliminal confusion among customers between Farberware and Mr. Coffee’s Quick
Brew).
298
See supra notes 163–75 and accompanying text.
299
Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 16, 46 (“The quality control requirement is even more
puzzling in the collateral . . . licensing contexts.”); Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs,
and Naked Licensing, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1759, 1767–68 (2006) (describing the quality control
requirement in collateral licensing as an unnecessary transaction cost impairing market efficiency);
Parks, supra note 172, at 538–39, 544–45 (asserting that in collateral licensing, there is no standard of
quality against which to compare the goods of the licensee).
300
Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 45–46 (“One cannot reasonably expect a collateral or
promotional licensor to police its licensees’ goods to determine whether they are of the same quality as
other goods bearing the same mark . . . .”); Parks, supra note 172, at 538–39 (“[T]here is no legitimate
reason for imposing additional quality control obligations on licensors . . . .”).
301
See Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 16 (providing Coca-Cola hypothetical); see also
Parks, supra note 172, at 538–39 (“[E]valuating the relative quality of the licensor’s primary goods and
licensed products is necessarily a meaningless comparison of ‘apples and oranges.’”).
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the products in question and hence has neither the knowledge nor the
expertise to specify appropriate quality standards for the licensee.302 In
addition, the economic incentive to engage in quality control is much
weaker for collateral licensors than for classical licensors because
consumer quality expectations in collateral markets are not high. Thus,
while a consumer has rather precise expectations from a Coke beverage, a
defective Coke teddy bear is unlikely to damage Coca-Cola’s reputation.303
Finally, as a matter of fact, collateral trademark licensors do not engage in
quality control programs, but merely preserve formal contractual rights to
control in order to satisfy the Lanham Act requirement.304
All this has led several scholars to conclude that, in the context of
collateral licensing, “[t]o require the owner of the trademark to inaugurate
an imaginary quality-control program to satisfy legal requirements,
constructed by courts in dissimilar situations, is to elevate form over
substance. The trademark owner is subject to unnecessary expense without
any real benefit to consumers.”305
Relying on similar arguments, David J. Franklyn argues for exempting
collateral licensors from tort liability for defective products.306 While
classical licensors are often engaged in the manufacturing process and
therefore should bear tort liability, collateral licensors are, practically
speaking, incapable of exercising quality control. Imposing liability on
them would therefore be inequitable.307 In collateral markets, the
trademark “licensor functions primarily as a promoter [of the product] and
does not appear to be a manufacturer.”308 Franklyn argues that when the
industry in which the trademark owner is licensing is far removed from his
primary field of activity, “consumers will be hard-pressed to argue that
302
See Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 16–17 (noting the lack of “relevant quality
benchmark[s]” in such scenarios); Keating, supra note 173, at 378 (describing quality control
requirements in such scenarios as “imaginary”); Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing—Towards a
More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 648 (1988) (“The trademark licensing rules with
respect to quality control have not caught up with business practice.”); Parks, supra note 172, at 544–
45 (describing the quality control requirement as rarely enforced in practice).
303
Neil A. Goldberg & Joseph L. Mooney, Product Licensing: An Emerging Litigation Arena,
FOR DEF., Dec. 2006, at 70, 74–75.
304
Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 14, 19 (“[B]eyond reserving such contractual rights, it
appears that many collateral and promotion licensors do little to fulfill the quality control
requirement.”); Johnston, supra note 156, at 35 (noting that licensor may be “susceptible to a charge of
naked licensing”).
305
Keating, supra note 173, at 378; see also Calboli, supra note 157, at 382–83 (summarizing
proponents of elimination of quality control requirements for promotional goods); Franklyn, Apparent
Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 690 (discussing Parks’s observations regarding evasion of control
requirements in collateral licensing); Johnston, supra note 156, at 35–36 (summarizing proponents of
elimination of quality control requirements for promotional goods); Parks, supra note 172, at 562
(describing Keating’s argument regarding a property right analysis).
306
Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 57–58.
307
Id. at 47 (“Such licensors are not compelling targets for strict liability because they rarely are
in a position to ensure that the licensed goods are free of defects.”).
308
Id.
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they believed the licensor made or dictated the standards for making the
licensed goods.”309 He suggests that the trademark owner is not a
“compelling target[]” for tort liability in such situations, since he is not “in
a position to ensure that the licensed goods are free of defects.”310 As the
degree of “collateralness” increases, the justification for imposing tort
liability on a trademark licensor decreases, Franklyn concludes.311
One of the few decisions that examines tort liability of a trademark
licensor in the context of a collateral market is an Indiana case, Kennedy v.
Guess, Inc.312 This case involved an umbrella that broke and struck the
plaintiff in the face, causing injuries. The umbrella bore the Guess
trademark and so the plaintiff sued Guess, Inc. as one of the parties
responsible for the defective umbrella. Guess, Inc., however, neither
ordered nor received the umbrellas at issue. It was never in possession of
any of the umbrellas nor did it manufacture, supply, distribute, assemble,
design, or sell them. Guess, Inc. simply licensed its name for placement on
various products, including umbrellas.313
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that by labeling the product as a
designer label product, Guess, Inc. vouched for the product and induced
the consumer to believe that the product she purchased was of a superior
quality.314 The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed, holding that trademark
licensors should bear responsibility for defective products bearing their
marks only inasmuch as their relative role in manufacturing, design, and
distribution warrants.315 This result is consistent with the dominant view in
the legal literature: collateral trademark licensors should be exempted from
tort liability, since they are not involved in the manufacturing process.
All this seems quite logical. If the trademark owner has no means of
performing quality control, how can the court require him, or even
encourage him, to exercise such control? And if the consumer does not
expect the trademark owner to control the quality of goods in collateral
markets, how will he benefit if such control is actually exercised?
Given the lack of quality control and the consumer’s assumed
understanding of this reality, we must still ask, why are brand extensions
so enormously profitable?316 Brand extensions allow the licensee to save
the promotional costs, to diminish the risks of entering a new market,317
309

Franklyn, Apparent Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 715.
Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 47.
311
Franklyn, Apparent Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 715.
312
806 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. 2004).
313
Id. at 779–83.
314
Kennedy v. Guess, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 213, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
315
Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 786.
316
See Magid et al., supra note 13, at 31–32 (listing several reasons why brand extensions
represent immense potential economic benefits for a business).
317
See Loken & John, supra note 88, at 71 (observing that firms seek to capitalize on established
brand names to decrease costs associated with launching new products); Magid et al., supra note 13, at
310
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and to charge premium prices.318 At the same time, they allow the
trademark owner to benefit from high fees without any efforts.319 Yet what
stands behind these fees? Why is a consumer inclined to buy a brand
extension, when there seems to be no rational basis for such preference?
Why would a consumer be inclined to buy a Jaguar perfume or HarleyDavidson sunglasses, when these companies clearly have no proven
expertise in the respective product fields?
The trend toward brand fetishism provides one possible explanation for
this behavior. As previously noted, trademark owners today strive to
create brands evoking strong consumer emotions,320 which can partly
explain the success of brand extensions. Indeed, consumers who have an
emotional relationship with a brand respond more positively to brand
extensions than consumers who have a functional relationship with the
brand, that is, consumers who perceive the brand merely as a carrier of
product information.321 The former group of loyal consumers tends to
broaden their loyalty to brand extensions.322
The success of brand extensions can also be linked to the “mere
exposure” effect.323 It has been well-established that people tend to
develop a preference for things merely out of familiarity. The more often a
person sees an object, the more pleasing and likeable that object.324 In
other words, even absent any special emotional relationship with a brand,
consumers may prefer a brand extension over a new brand simply because
they are familiar with the name.325
A trademark in collateral markets, then, does not serve to provide
product information and save consumer search costs. Rather, its primary
32 (noting the reduction in promotional costs); Pitta & Katsanis, supra note 88, at 51 (“Leveraging the
brand equity of a successful brand promises to make introduction of a new entry less costly by trading
on an established name.”).
318
Joffre Swait et al., The Equalization Price: A Measure of Consumer-Perceived Brand Equity,
10 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 23, 25–26 (1993).
319
Bannon, supra note 165, at 587 (“Quite simply, the trademark owner sees a ‘cash cow’ when
he is shown the value of licensing his trademark and the potential of ‘exploitation.’”).
320
See supra Part II.B.
321
AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 155.
322
BHOTE, supra note 47, at 31; see also Fournier, supra note 62, at 365 (providing an example of
loyal consumers who buy brand extensions).
323
Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
June 1968, at 1, 1–2.
324
Id. at 1, 3 (describing the elements of the author’s examination of the frequency-value
relationship).
325
Marketing literature does not elaborate on the psychological reasons causing consumers to
purchase brand extensions. However, two sources mention the “mere exposure effect” as a possible
reason for the success of brand extensions. See Dacin & Smith, supra note 112, at 233 (“[I]n forming
judgments about an extension, consumers are likely to refer more to their beliefs about individual
products affiliated with the brand.”); Zeynep Gürhan-Canli & Durairaj Maheswaran, The Effects of
Extensions on Brand Name Dilution and Enhancement, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 464, 472 (1998) (“Our
findings also appear to be consistent with mere exposure effects, which suggests that repeated exposure
may lead to increased preference for proattitudinal arguments in low-involvement conditions.”).
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function is to exploit a consumer’s emotions or uncontrolled mental
reactions for the benefit of the trademark owner and the licensee.
Licensing fees are paid for the mere possibility to exploit the psychological
effects of the mark on the consumer.
It is true that in the context of collateral licensing, quality control of
the trademark owner has no real benefit for the consumer. But this very
fact indicates that collateral licensing as a whole has little economic benefit
for the consumer. It has never been the purpose of trademark law to
protect the psychological influence of trademarks on the consumer. The
competitive advantage gained by using a trademark on dissimilar products
is not justifiable in economic terms. In addition, brand extensions cause
market concentration, allowing big firms to grow ever bigger.326
Trademarks should not be protected outside their primary markets.
The borderline between the primary market and collateral markets should
be determined based on whether the consumer reasonably assumes that the
trademark owner manufactures the goods in question or exercises a quality
control over these goods. If the customer does not assume so, the
trademark carries no economic benefit for her. Therefore, the customer
will suffer no financial damage if another company uses an identical
trademark and establishes its own trademark rights in a collateral market.
Put differently, the consumer would not suffer economic damage if the
company owning the trademark Jaguar for perfume were to have no
connection to luxury Jaguar cars.
Trademark law is not compelled to follow commercial reality. If the
practice of brand extensions has led the modern consumer to believe that
virtually any use of famous trademarks requires authorization, it does not
mean that trademark law has no choice but to protect these trademarks in
all product fields. Trademark law should act to shape, rather than merely
reflect business norms.327 As will be discussed presently, consumer
perception in the context of collateral markets is flexible and easily
changeable. The elimination of trademark protection in these markets will
326
Louis A. Thomas, Incumbent Firms’ Response to Entry: Price, Advertising, and New Product
Introduction, 17 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 527, 538–40 (1999).
327
A similar argument was made in the context of trademark protection in merchandising
markets. See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 613 (1984) [hereinafter Denicola, Institutional Publicity
Rights] (discussing the utilization of qualified injunctions to minimize anticompetitive consequences
while also reducing confusion); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 487–88 (“The real underlying
issue is whether the trademark law should act here as a creator or as a reflector of societal norms.”). In
the context of the post-sale confusion doctrine, see Austin, supra note 256, at 175 (“[S]hould the law
fall into step with marketers’ innovations, and bolster their activities with legal rights to match?”). And
in the context of territorial aspects of trademark law, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and
Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 889–90 (2004)
(“[S]hould trademark law be structured reactively to protect whatever consumer understandings or
producer goodwill develops, or should it proactively seek to shape the ways in which consumers shop
and producers sell or seek to acquire rights, thus shaping how the economy functions?”).
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eventually eliminate consumer confusion as well.
3. The Flexibility of Consumer Perception in the Context of Collateral
Markets
Traditionally, trademark law protected trademarks only in their
primary markets.328 Thus, the legal assumption was that a consumer could
bear in mind several trademarks, each indicating another company in a
different product field. Has the modern consumer, in an era of extreme
corporate diversification, lost this ability? Apparently not. Identical marks
peacefully coexist in different markets today: witness Eagle shirts, Eagle
pencils, Eagle Pretzels, and Eagle condensed milk; or Delta airlines, Delta
dental insurance, and Delta faucets.329
Courts consistently state that when different companies in collateral
markets use identical trademarks for a number of years, the public learns to
distinguish between the companies. In such cases, the junior user acquires
trademark rights in the market in which he has used the mark and the
senior user cannot expand into this market.330 As Judge Learned Hand
noted, “[t]he owner’s rights in such appendant markets are easily lost; they
must be asserted early, lest they be made the means of reaping a harvest
which others have sown.”331 For example, one company owned the
trademark Heartland for women’s shoes, while a junior user used the same
mark for shirts. The court held that the senior user did not have a right to
expand into the product field of the junior user.332 In another case, a junior
user was held to have acquired exclusive rights in the trademark “Tiffan E”
for cosmetics, which prevented the owner of the jewelry mark from
expanding into this field.333
The flexibility of consumer perception in the context of collateral
markets is especially evident in the field of assignment and license-back
agreements and coexistence agreements. Assignment and license-back
agreements are generally employed to settle trademark conflicts, especially
pending litigations.334 The defendant assigns its trademark to the plaintiff
and the plaintiff licenses the mark back to the defendant.335 Assignment
and license-back agreements are said to have the beneficial effect of
328

See supra Part IV.B.1.
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:11.
330
See, e.g., Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2003);
Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 435 (3d Cir. 2000);
Artcraft Novelties Corp. v. Baxter Lane Co. of Amarillo, 685 F.2d 988, 989–91 (5th Cir. 1982); Mach.
Head v. Dewey Global Holdings Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Clark &
Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 138–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
331
Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943).
332
Clark & Freeman, 811 F. Supp. at 141.
333
Am. Hygienic Labs. Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1979, 1983 (T.T.A.B. 1989).
334
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:9; Calboli, supra note 157, at 384 (observing that such
agreements are most frequently utilized to settle claims of trademark infringement).
335
See, e.g., Calboli, supra note 157, at 384 (describing the practice of license-back).
329
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bringing commercial reality into congruence with customer perception;
consumer confusion is eliminated by bringing the two sources of goods
bearing the same mark together.336
Coexistence agreements337 are likewise entered into to settle trademark
disputes. The parties to such agreements essentially agree not to sue each
other as long as each does not overstep the boundaries of his product
area.338 A coexistence agreement is neither an assignment nor a license. It
is a recognition that a concurrent use of the mark by both parties is not
likely to cause confusion because of the differences in their goods.339 That
is, parties recognize that their marks can coexist peacefully. Thus, while a
license integrates, a coexistence agreement differentiates.340
Theoretically, these two types of agreements are designed for mutually
exclusive situations. When consumer confusion is likely, only assignment
and license-back agreement may be employed.341 A coexistence agreement
is inappropriate in such situations: parties cannot conspire to confuse the
consumer.
In theory, coexistence agreements made under such
circumstances should be held void.342 In practice, however, the choice
between these two types of agreements is essentially at the parties’
discretion. For example, in a dispute between a winery and a salami
manufacturer, both using the mark “Gallo,” the winery acquired the mark
from the salami manufacturer, and subsequently licensed the mark back to
the same manufacturer.343 By contrast, when one party was using the
trademark “Sunkist” on citrus fruit, and the other was using the mark “SunKist” on canned fruit and vegetables, the parties decided to enter a
coexistence agreement.344 The fact that, practically speaking, trademark
owners can choose between these two types of agreements is also evident
from the legal literature, where trademark owners are advised to opt for a
coexistence agreement if they wish to escape tort liability.345
Assignment and license-back agreements often result in nominal
336
See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1824, 1831 (9th Cir.
1992) (“That the transfer of the GALLO SALAME mark served the goal of minimizing consumer
confusion becomes most clear when we view the assignment/lease-back transaction as a whole.”);
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:9 (describing the Gallo wine case to exemplify the usefulness of
assignment and license-back in settling litigation disputes).
337
Coexistence agreements are also called “consent to use agreements.”
338
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:79.
339
Id.
340
Id.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1824, 1831 (9th Cir. 1992).
344
Cal. Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 1947) (dismissing
complaint for unfair competition and infringement of trademarks).
345
Mary Hutchings Reed, Trademarks in the Sale of Part of a Business: Concurrent Use and
Licensing, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 514, 536 (1990) (“[C]oncurrent use agreement is preferable,
particularly because it avoids the product liability pitfalls inherent in licensing agreements.”).
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control by the stronger company over the weaker one.346 Often, the
licensor does not exercise any meaningful quality control, so each party
continues to manufacture its goods as it did prior to the agreement.347 The
common trademark in such cases is merely a legal fiction, allowing one
party to charge the other for royalties, while in reality there are two
trademark users before and after the agreement. On the other hand,
coexistence agreements often represent mutual consent, motivated by
business considerations, to use trademarks on closely related goods
notwithstanding the likelihood of consumer confusion. There is even some
evidence that such agreements include payment of fees,348 although this
does not make sense when the parties recognize that no one infringes on
the other’s rights.
Meanwhile, courts are extremely reluctant to establish a likelihood of
confusion that would render a coexistence agreement invalid.349 The
general rule is that the public interest in preventing confusion must be
balanced against the public interest in contract enforcement.350 This latter
interest is given great weight. Even when consumer confusion is found,
coexistence agreements are upheld, unless the public is substantially
harmed.351 For instance, in one case, the court upheld a coexistence
agreement allowing one party to use the trademark “Field and Stream” for
a hunting and fishing magazine, while allowing another party to use the
same mark for clothing, including fishing and hunting clothing.352
Note that in conflicts over trademark rights, confusion is found even
when the goods of the parties operate in somewhat more distant fields.
Thus, the magazine trademarks “Esquire,” “Seventeen,” “Playboy,” and
“Vogue” were protected from unauthorized uses on slippers, luggage,

346

See Calboli, supra note 157, at 384–85 (describing the primary purpose of assignment and
license-back agreements as acquiring control of the assigned mark).
347
Id. (“[A]ssignors/licensees enter these transactions primarily to avoid a finding of trademark
infringement and to continue using the mark at issue for the same products as prior to the signing of the
agreement . . . .”).
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Ron Cauldwell Jewelry Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2009, 2012
(T.T.A.B. 2002) (“Despite opposer’s arguments to the contrary, the record is devoid of any evidence
which raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the coexistence agreement . . . lacks
consideration . . . .”).
349
See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Field & Stream Licenses Co., 294 F.3d 383, 396 (2d
Cir. 2002); Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986);
T & T Mfg. Co. v. A. T. Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533, 539 (1st Cir. 1978).
350
T & T Mfg., 587 F.2d at 539 (discussing the public interest in avoiding confusion and the
policy of deference to contractual agreements).
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Times Mirror Magazines, 294 F.3d at 396 (“In the absence of significant harm to the public,
the district court correctly declined to don the mantle of public interest to save plaintiff from a harm
that is permitted by the contract.”).
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Id. at 391 (“We conclude . . . that the rights of the parties to use the mark in connection with
the goods at issue in this lawsuit are defined by the agreements rather than by any residual trademark
right.”).
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353

automotive supplies, and hats respectively.
One might wonder, what
does it matter from the consumer’s perspective when the trademark owner
consents to the concurrent use?
We can observe that courts tend to regard trademark rights in collateral
markets as pure property rights, shaped by private interests and agreements
rather than the consumer’s perception. The trademark owner is regarded as
someone having priority rights over the trademark in collateral markets. 354
If he chooses to enter a certain collateral market himself, or simply to
assert his rights when someone else is trying to enter this market, the
trademark rights in this market will belong to him. If, however, the
trademark owner consents to the concurrent use by a junior user in a
collateral market, or if he does not sue the junior user in time, such user
will acquire trademark rights in the collateral market.
All this illustrates that in the context of collateral markets, courts
implicitly doubt the usefulness of the maxim that trademark rights should
be determined based on the question of consumer confusion. While I share
this view, I believe that it should not lead us to conclude that trademark
rights should be determined on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the
interests and the behavior of the specific trademark owners and other
private parties. This conception of trademarks as pure private property
should be rejected. Instead, consumer perception should be the only basis
for trademark protection.
To quote the 1928 Yale decision once again, “a merchant may have a
sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his
own exploitation . . . . His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for
the goods which bear it . . . .”355 This is the correct understanding of the
concept of a trademark. A trademark should be protected only so far as the
consumer perceives it as the authentic seal of its owner.
The perception of a mark as an authentic seal does not change as
rapidly as the perception of a mark as a symbol of some ephemeral
connection to its owner. While consumers can easily be convinced to
assume that trademark owners require authorization for virtually every use
of their marks, they will not be so quick to assume that trademark owners
actually vouch for the goods that bear their marks. Indeed, while today’s
consumers expect virtually every use of a famous trademark to be
353

Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540, 546 (1st Cir. 1957); Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924); HMH Publ’g Co. v. Brincat, 342 F. Supp.
1275, 1281–82 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Standard Plastic Prods., Inc., 241 F. Supp.
613, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1965). For additional examples, see MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:61.
354
There is a general tendency in trademark law to view trademarks as broad property rights. For
a review and critique of this tendency, see Assaf, supra note 8, at 74–82 (outlining the property rhetoric
of trademark law); Johnston, supra note 156, at 22–29 (describing the changing form of licensing
trademarks throughout time); Lemley, supra note 140, at 1693–94 (addressing the “increasing tendency
to treat trademarks as assets with their own intrinsic value”).
355
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
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authorized,356 they do not expect the trademark owner to exercise quality
control while licensing into collateral markets.357
It should therefore be decided that trademarks are not to be protected in
collateral markets, in principle. A corresponding consumer perception will
follow. If the consumer is not substantially damaged by “Field and
Stream” hunting clothes, produced without the authorization of the Field
and Stream hunting magazine publisher, she will similarly not be damaged
by unauthorized Playboy automotive supplies. If the consumer can adjust
to “Tiffan E” for cosmetics, she can also get accustomed to “Classic
Tiffany” for automobiles.
4. An Intermediate Conclusion: Collateral Markets and Brand
Fetishism
To achieve the result of denying trademark protection in collateral
markets, two rules should be adopted. First, trademark licenses in
collateral markets should be deemed void due to the licensor’s inability to
exercise meaningful quality control. Second, unauthorized trademark uses
in collateral markets should neither be enjoined as trademark infringement
nor as dilution. By adopting these two rules, brand fetishism will abate, in
at least three ways.
First, the mere fact that brand extensions into collateral markets will be
impossible will undermine the incentive to invest in brand personalities.
As discussed above, functional, product-related trademarks are less
profitable today, for they are less extendible into other product areas.358 If
collateral markets cease to represent a profit potential, trademarks
conveying spirit and soul will become somewhat less profitable.
Consequently, the incentives to create trademarks conveying skill and
expertise will increase.
Second, as noted above, brand extensions into dissimilar product areas
are an indispensable part of brand fetishism. They disconnect the brand
from physical products, demonstrating that it conveys a larger concept and
can operate as an independent entity.359 In other words, the fact that
entirely different skills are necessary in order to manufacture cars and
perfume or motorbikes and sunglasses encourages the consumer to
perceive Jaguar and Harley-Davidson brands as much broader concepts
than simply “authentic seals,” that is, as signifying origins of product
manufacture or quality control.
Trademark law should begin to recognize its role as a creator of
356

MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 10:43.
Franklyn, Apparent Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 691 (noting that, especially within
collateral licensing context, consumers do not assume a trademark “signifies that the trademark owner
made the product or that it is the source of quality control standards”).
358
See supra Part II.D.
359
Id.
357
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consumer perceptions, and act accordingly. Over the years, by providing
legal support for most remote brand extensions, trademark law has taught
the consumer to perceive brands as independent entities, thereby endorsing
brand fetishism. If trademark protection in collateral markets is now
denied, the consumer perception will consequently change. If each
trademark is restricted to a certain product context, branded products will
be seen as simple “commodities” rather than as entities with personality
and soul. This would undermine brand fetishism.
Third, as discussed in Part II.D, the most important factor for a
successful brand extension is the compatibility of the extension with the
brand’s concept.360 Much in the same manner, unauthorized uses of a
trademark on products incompatible with its image may rupture the
coherence of the brand’s concept. Many courts regard the need to prevent
this damage as the main justification for protection against dilution.361
Real as it may be, this damage should not be prevented. On the contrary,
allowing famous trademarks to be used in collateral markets would weaken
brand fetishism. If consumers constantly encounter “Rolls Royce”
insecticide, “Chanel” floor wax, and the like, the idolized status of brands
will probably be somewhat shaken.
C. Merchandising Markets
A trademark’s “merchandising market” includes the sale of brand
paraphernalia, such as T-shirts, cups, or posters displaying the mark. Such
goods are normally purchased by consumers wishing to express their
loyalty to the mark.
For a long time, merchandising goods displaying famous trademarks
were sold without licenses from trademark owners.362 As corporations
began building up brands with personalities and souls in the 1980s,363 they
also began to understand the enormous potential profit from selling brand
merchandise. As a result, corporations started claiming exclusive rights
over the merchandising markets of their brands.364
The courts’ reactions to these new claims varied. Some courts found
360

Id.
See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating
that dilution “corrodes the senior user’s interest in the trademark by blurring its product identification
or by damaging positive associations that have attached to it”); Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc.,
699 F.2d 621, 624–25 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The interest protected . . . is not simply commercial goodwill,
but the selling power that a distinctive mark or name with favorable associations has engendered for a
product in the mind of the consuming public.”); Tiffany & Co. v. Bos. Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836,
844 (D. Mass. 1964) (“The risk of detraction may be a risk of an erosion of the public’s identification
of this very strong mark with the plaintiff alone, thus diminishing its distinctiveness, uniqueness,
effectiveness, and prestigious connotations . . . .”).
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Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 472; Johnston, supra note 156, at 30.
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that consumers who buy merchandising goods only wish to express their
identification with the trademark owner. Such consumers do not
reasonably expect that all merchandise bearing the trademark has
necessarily been licensed by its owner.365 Besides, the consumers are
usually indifferent to the question of whether such a license exists and
thus, cannot be confused.366 Other courts, however, held that trademark
owners should have exclusive rights over merchandising markets, but
could not articulate such a right using the traditional tools of trademark
law.367
In Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Manufacturing, Inc.,368 the concept of trademark infringement was
substantially broadened so as to embrace the merchandising market. The
court stated that the confusion requirement is met by the mere fact that the
consumer identifies the symbols appearing on the sold merchandise as
symbols originating from the trademark owner.369 The argument that there
must be confusion as to the manufacturer of the goods was found
unpersuasive where the trademark was the “triggering mechanism for the
sale” of the goods.370 Although this decision was subjected to harsh
criticism in legal practice371 and scholarly literature,372 courts have
increasingly accepted its conclusions. Over the course of time, the right of
trademark owners over merchandising markets came to be taken for
granted.373
Today, such a far-reaching interpretation of the concept of consumer
365
E.g., Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079,
1083 (5th Cir. 1982); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir.
1980); Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 172–73 (M.D.N.C.
1989).
366
Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. at 173.
367
E.g., Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989); Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n
v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir.
1983); Bos. Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg, Inc,, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.
1975).
368
510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
369
Id. at 1012.
370
Id.
371
Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The
Boston Hockey decision transmogrifies th[e] narrow [trademark] protection into a broad monopoly.”);
Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. Supp. 359, 362 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (“[A] broad reading
of the Boston Pro Hockey decision would have the effect of changing the focus of the trademark laws
from the protection of the public to the protection of the trademark owner’s business interest.”).
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See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 168; W.J.
Keating, Patches on the Trademark Law, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 315, 315–17 (1977); Charles A. Laff &
Larry L. Saret, Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches, Paladin and Laurel and Hardy, 66
TRADEMARK REP. 427, 443–45 (1976).
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Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2006); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of
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confusion as employed in Boston Professional Hockey is no longer
necessary.
By consistently enjoining unauthorized merchandising
products, courts have effectively influenced consumer perception.
Empirical data suggests that today a large majority of the public believes
that authorization is needed to display a trademark on merchandising
products.374
Obviously, a trademark does not play any informative function when
displayed on merchandising goods. The legal literature recognizes that
consumers of brand merchandise are not motivated by assumptions about
the quality of products, but by the desire to express loyalty, admiration, or
sympathy with the trademark owner.375 There is no substantial product
behind the trademark—the trademark itself is the product desired by the
consumer.376 Consumers do not believe that the trademark owner produces
merchandising products or controls their quality.377 Accordingly, scholars
strongly advocate a complete abandonment of the quality control
requirement,378 and an absolute exemption from tort liability for trademark
licensors379 in the context of merchandising.
Consumer confusion in the context of merchandising is essentially
confined to the question whether the consumer thinks that it is legal to
display one’s trademark on merchandising products without obtaining a
license and paying a fee. Meanwhile, many consumers are indifferent as to
whether such license exists.380 For those who are not, prominent
disclaimers would be an easy solution.381
All this demonstrates that consumer confusion is a shaky rationale for
providing trademark rights over merchandising markets. A number of

374
In 1983, a survey showed that 91.2% of the people interviewed thought that an owner of a
name or character had to give permission before a product could bear its name. MCCARTHY, supra
note 31, § 24:12.
375
This is known as the so-called “‘LAS’ factor.” Keating, supra note 173, at 372; Parks, supra
note 172, at 544; Kuss, supra note 163, at 376.
376
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 463 & n.9, 472; Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961 (1993).
377
Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982) (“No one
would seriously assert that a significant segment of the public believes that Pitt actually manufactured
the goods involved.”); Keating, supra note 173, at 372.
378
Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 46; Keating, supra note 173, at 378; Marks, supra note
302, at 648–50; Parks, supra note 172, at 544–45.
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380
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(“[T]he court is skeptical that those individuals who purchase unlicensed tee-shirts bearing [University
of North Carolina] marks care one way or the other whether the University sponsors or endorses such
products or whether the products are officially licensed.”); Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and
Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2154 (2004); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 488; C.
Knox Withers, Sine Qua Non: Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of Confusion, and the Business of
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legal scholars recognize this point.382 Some conclude that confusion
should no longer be required; displaying another’s trademark on
merchandising goods should be regarded as an unjustified
Others suggest denying
misappropriation of another’s property.383
trademark protection in this field.384 Opening merchandising markets to
competition would reduce prices and enhance quality, they argue.385
Trademark protection in merchandising markets constitutes the most
explicit legal encouragement of brand fetishism. As discussed in Part II.E,
displaying brand merchandise is an essentially ritualistic behavior.386 A
consumer wearing a brand T-shirt or hanging a brand poster on his
bedroom wall is the ultimate “committed customer,” who has fully
internalized the idea that the brand is an independent spiritual being, which
can be liberated from any connection with material goods. Brand
merchandise evokes the brand’s spirit, devoid of any product-related
substance.387
The merchandising right is the ultimate right in the trademarked
symbol itself, in the trademark as a spiritual being, and as a subject of
devotion and worship. If trademark law allows trademark owners to profit
from the exploitation of the purely symbolic dimensions of their marks, it
eventually encourages them to create these dimensions. This incentive is
not negligible: the legendary Hard Rock Café, for instance, garners much
more profit from merchandising than from its core restaurant services.388 If
we believe that brand fetishism should be discouraged, this provides a
convincing reason to deny trademark protection in merchandising markets.

382

Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights, supra note 327, at 614–15 (“In the context of
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V. ARE THERE ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES FOR SUPPORTING BRAND
FETISHISM?
As demonstrated in the previous section, trademark law today
essentially supports and encourages brand fetishism, although its
traditional rationales speak in favor of discouraging this practice. This
section examines whether there are alternative rationales for supporting
brand fetishism and sustaining the legal doctrines facilitating this fetishism.
The U.S. legal system presumes liberty as a starting point. Legal
protection restricts liberty and therefore, requires justification.
Specifically, legal protection of trademarks restricts the liberty of others to
use trademarks. Traditionally, this restriction was justified by the need to
encourage trademark owners to invest in the quality of their goods,389
thereby mitigating the risk of the market failure known as “the market for
lemons.”390 This justification holds only as long as trademark protection is
limited to the informational function of the mark. When one wishes to
protect additional trademark dimensions, alternative rationales are needed
to justify the respective additional restrictions on liberty. In other words,
we must examine whether the spiritual dimensions of brands serve any
important social purposes that could justify their protection.
While consumers who misjudge product quality because of emotional
attachments to the brand present a clear case for discouraging brand
fetishism, some consumers quite intentionally purchase the symbolic
dimensions of brands. These consumers can be roughly divided into two
groups: (1) those who wish to communicate their social status, group
identification, etc. through brands; and (2) those who use brands to satisfy
their spiritual needs for community, religion, or ideology. Accordingly,
our primary question as to whether alternative rationales for protection of
brand personalities exist may be similarly broken down: (1) whether
brands should be protected as tools of personal communication; and (2)
whether brands should be protected as sources of ideology, community,
and religion.
A. Should Brands Be Protected as Tools of Personal Communication?
Should trademark law help trademark owners provide consumers with
efficient means of personal communication? If there is a consumer
389

MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 2:3–4.
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490–92 (1970). The article describes the market failure caused by
information asymmetry, giving as an example the market for used cars, in which consumers cannot
estimate the quality of the cars and therefore, are unwilling to pay higher prices for high-quality cars.
The owners of high quality cars will be unwilling to place their cars in such a market and thus, the
market will consist only of defective cars—“lemons.” Trademarks are designed to serve as quality
signals and to solve this type of market failure.
390
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demand for brands as personal communication tools, why should this not
serve as a sufficient rationale for encouraging the market to supply such
tools?
As already discussed in the context of post-sale confusion, there is also
a sufficient demand for imitations of branded products.391 That is, while
some consumers wish to use brands as truthful means of communication,
others wish to wield them dishonestly. Protecting trademarks as
communication tools results in privileging the former group over the latter.
However, there is no good reason for doing so. Both groups have
legitimate interests in the market of personal transactions.
The problem of emulation of communicative tools in the market of
personal transactions is an old one,392 and over time this market has
developed efficient tools to communicate one’s social status: education,
taste, knowledge, etc.393 When brands are legally protected as means of
personal communication, this encourages “branded,” materialistic channels
of personal transactions. Viewed more broadly, this protection serves to
make material goals more socially significant and hence encourage
individuals to strive for these goals rather than for other goals. Thus, the
legal protection currently provided by trademark law may be one reason
for the increasing presence of “branded” personal communication, and for
the heightened materialism of modern western culture.
The legal system should generally refrain from exerting cultural
influence by providing individuals with certain types of communication
channels. In addition, there are good reasons not to encourage materialistic
communication and materialistic culture in particular. In his famous book
The High Price of Materialism, Tim Kasser describes a comprehensive
empirical study on materialistic values, which shows that when personal
interactions are based on materialistic values, less empathy and intimacy
are present in relationships.394 Kasser’s research also demonstrates that
materialistic values undermine individuals’ physical well-being and
psychological health.395 “To the extent we can break . . . some of the
vicious cycles brought about by a focus on materialism, we will be able to
improve the quality of life for ourselves, our families [and] our
communities,” Kasser concludes.396 In protecting trademarks as tools of
personal communication, trademark law pushes us in the opposite
direction.

391

See supra Part IV.A.4.
See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text (providing the example of lace).
393
This argument is extensively developed in PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL
CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1984).
394
TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM 87–95 (2002).
395
Id. at 5–22.
396
Id. at 115.
392

146

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:83

B. Should Brands Be Protected as Sources of Ideology, Community, and
Religion?
Consumers who engage in brand cults, form brand communities, and
buy brand merchandise explicitly recognize brands as spiritual beings, as
sources of community, ideology, and religion. Some scholars argue that as
community, ideology, and religion decline, brands legitimately fill the void
left by these institutions.397 In fact, marketing experts intentionally target
these goals. For instance, Douglas B. Holt argues that identity brands
compete in myth markets, not in product markets.398 He suggests that to
achieve an iconic status, the brand should be imbued with myths that play
upon cultural tensions.399 In his book The Culting of Brands: When
Customers Become True Believers, Douglas Atkin writes: “Belonging is a
fundamental dictate of the human condition . . . . Not to provide
communities is not to satisfy a basic need. And not satisfying a basic need
with a commercial answer would be the shame of most business people.”400
Later he adds: “The craving need to make meaning is part of the human
condition. And again, if you don’t satisfy a craving need with a
commercial answer, you should be thrown into the business hall of
infamy.”401
Legally protecting brand personalities implicitly lends approval to this
approach. I believe this is undesirable. The fact that people today have a
certain deficit of community, ideology, and religion does not mean that
these needs should be fulfilled by commercial channels; it certainly does
not mean that the law should actively facilitate this process. People may
participate in the cults of brand fetishism, but that does not mean that they
crave spiritual satisfaction in the form of brands.
In a similar vein, Kalle Lasn writes: “The commercial mass media is
rearranging our neurons, manipulating our emotions, making powerful new
connections between deep immaterial needs and material products.”402
This description makes a valuable point: brand fetishism does not originate
with private people. It is created and maintained by the marketing
activities of commercial corporations. William Leach likewise argues that
consumer culture is one of the most nonconsensual public cultures ever
397
ATKIN, supra note 55, at 201–02 (“We’ve reached a unique intersection in society that favors
marketers. On one side, established [social, religious, and political] institutions are proving to be
increasingly inadequate sources of meaning and community. On the other, [m]arketing is reaching its
maturity in terms of shrewdness and artfulness.” (citations omitted)); Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58,
at 428 (“If it is true that modernity has brought with it . . . ‘the disenchantment of the world,’ is it
possible that community could coalesce around brands of things, to satisfy . . . a yearning for a
‘reconstructed and re-mystified community?’ We believe so.” (citations omitted)).
398
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created, since it has not been produced “by people” but by profit-seeking
commercial entities.403
To a certain extent, it can be said that brand fetishism currently
competes in the “market” for religions and ideologies. It vigorously
competes for the right to occupy the spiritual spaces of our society. A
modern western citizen is inundated with messages trying to convince her
that spiritual needs can be satisfied by commercial brands. As Leach puts
it, commercial culture raises to the fore only one vision of the good life,
pushing out all others.404 We are much more often persuaded that brands
will bring us happiness than that a certain religion or worldview will do the
same—for devotion to a brand brings much more economic gain than any
other type of devotion. Consequently, the incentive to promote brand
fetishism is much greater than the incentive to promote any other ideology
or religion.
By supporting brand fetishism, the legal system facilitates and
promotes its role in the spiritual sphere. Yet there are valid reasons to keep
commercial and spiritual spheres apart, or at the least not to encourage
their fusion through legal rules. These two realms do—and should—
function differently in many respects. For instance, the spiritual realm is
not directly motivated by the desire for economic revenues gained from
followers to the same extent as is the commercial market. In the spiritual
sphere, preachers are usually true believers, while in the commercial
world, “preachers” tend to be professionals in techniques of psychological
influence.
If trademark protection is constrained to the informational function of
the mark, there will be much less of an incentive for corporations to strive
to satisfy our spiritual needs with commercial brands. And when brands
retreat from the spiritual spaces of our society, alternative, nonconsumerist visions of the good life will have a fair chance of rising to the
fore.
VI. CONCLUSION
“The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the
psychological function of symbols.”405
This observation, made by Justice Frankfurter in 1942, is more
accurate today. In a market saturated with material goods, the emotional
dimensions of products, as embodied in their trademarks, are becoming
ever more important.
This Article has focused on brand fetishism, the tendency of modern
403
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corporations to shape trademarks as independent spiritual entities, rather
than as mere designations of origin. It has demonstrated that trademark
law assists corporations in achieving this goal. Trademark law plays a
central role in creating and maintaining consumer perceptions about
trademarks. The choice as to which psychological functions of trademarks
will enjoy protection lies within the purview of the legal system. This
choice should be made with great care. The legal system should refrain
from supporting ungrounded beliefs about trademarks.
The primary function of trademarks is to identify the trademark owner
as the source of goods. As long as trademark law protects this
psychological function of trademarks, it is supported by firm economic
justifications. By contrast, the perception of trademarks as entities with
personalities and souls deserves no legal protection. Trademark elements
designed
to
influence
the
consumer
on
the
emotional
level should be left outside the area protected by trademark law. Yet, as
this Article has pointed out, these functions currently do enjoy extensive
legal protection. For instance, trademark owners are allowed to license
their marks to third parties, refrain from being involved in the
manufacturing process of the licensees, and later assume no liability for
low-quality and defective products bearing their marks. This legal
situation allows trademark owners to exploit their marks as mere
psychological stimuli rather than as designations of origin.
Not every commercial trend should be encouraged by the legal system.
Trademark law should cease to endorse the trend toward brand fetishism.
It should actively create and shape consumer perceptions and business
norms. It should take steps to demystify brands and to restore the
trademark’s primary function—as an indicator of origin and quality of
goods. While corporations may sometimes wish to elevate the trademark
over the product—the form over the substance—such efforts should enjoy
no legal support. A trademark should be legally protected only as a name,
not as a rose.

